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Abstract 
We often make decisions with incomplete knowledge of their consequences. Might people nonetheless 
expect others to make optimal choices, despite this ignorance? Here, we show that people are sensitive to 
moral optimality: that people hold moral agents accountable depending on whether they make optimal choices, 
even when there is no way that the agent could know which choice was optimal. This result held up whether 
the outcome was positive, negative, inevitable, or unknown, and across within-subjects and between-
subjects designs. Participants consistently distinguished between optimal and suboptimal choices, but not 
between suboptimal choices of varying quality — a signature pattern of the Efficiency Principle found in 
other areas of cognition. A mediation analysis revealed that the optimality effect occurs because people find 
suboptimal choices more difficult to explain and assign harsher blame accordingly, while moderation 
analyses found that the effect does not depend on tacit inferences about the agent’s knowledge or 
negligence. We argue that this moral optimality bias operates largely out of awareness, reflects broader 
tendencies in how humans understand one another’s behavior, and has real-world implications.  
 
Keywords: Moral judgment; Lay decision theory; Theory of mind; Decision-making; Causal attribution.  
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Introduction 
We hold others accountable for their actions based on what they were thinking. If a student cheats on 
an exam, a scientist fabricates a result, or a company mistreats a customer, our judgment depends on their 
motives and beliefs. Empirical studies confirm this intuition (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Gray & Wegner, 
2008), and all theories of blame must account for it (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 
2014; Shaver, 1985; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Yet, people often seem to blame others for 
things they could not possibly have known about. In 2009, a group of seismologists issued a statement 
indicating that an earthquake in L’Aquila, Italy was unlikely; when an earthquake struck and killed 308 
people, they were charged with manslaughter. Despite the defense’s insistence that it is simply beyond the 
powers of science to predict earthquakes, the scientists were sentenced to prison. Although the convictions 
were ultimately overturned, incidents like this highlight ways in which our moral judgments can sometimes 
directly contradict inferences about agents’ intentions. It is perfectly clear that the scientists did not — and 
could not — know that the earthquake would hit, yet many people blamed the scientists all the same. What 
psychological principles could explain such paradoxical judgments?  
One likely factor is the outcome bias (e.g., Baron & Hershey, 1988) wherein people blame agents for 
negative consequences despite positive intentions. For example, the scientists might have been blamed so long 
as the earthquake occurred, even if the scientists took pains to avoid making the incorrect prediction that 
the earthquake would not occur. In real world cases, however, multiple factors are often at play. Not only 
did the scientists’ choice result in a bad outcome, but, unknown to the scientists, it was also suboptimal. That is, 
even before the earthquake itself, an omniscient scientist could have known that the earthquake was likely to 
occur. Thus, the optimal choice would objectively have been to recommend evacuation. Given that 
scientists and other humans are not omniscient, the scientists did not and could not have known that their 
choice was suboptimal. Yet might people nonetheless blame agents for making suboptimal choices, even 
when agents have no way of knowing that their choices are suboptimal? 
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The Efficiency Principle. We propose that moral judgments are influenced by a principle people use 
for understanding others’ behavior, which can override inferences about mental states: People expect agents 
to behave optimally or efficiently, relative to the agent’s goals and the constraints of the situation (Dennett, 
1987; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). To use an analogy outside of moral judgment, if the car to our right changes 
lanes, we could understand that decision in terms of the assumed beliefs and desires of the car’s driver; but 
in most cases, we probably use the simpler strategy of understanding the car’s behavior in terms of more 
general features of the world, such as common goals (avoiding collisions) and broad situational constraints 
(intuitive physics and geometry), and assuming optimal decision-making relative to those constraints. This 
Efficiency Principle runs psychologically deep. It develops before a representational theory of mind (Csibra et 
al., 1999; Gergely et al., 2003) and may scaffold later-emerging mental-state inferences. It also plays 
important roles — often outside of awareness — in other domains of cognition, including visual perception 
(Gao & Scholl, 2011) and language understanding (Davidson, 1967; Grice, 1989). 
Most of the time, efficiency-based thinking leads to the same conclusions as mentalizing — after all, 
people behave in a reasonably rational manner much of the time. For example, imagine that Jill is deciding 
which of three shampoos to buy, wanting to make her hair smell like apples. Suppose that the three brands 
have different likelihoods of achieving this goal — one has a 70% efficacy (call this “Best”), one a 50% 
efficacy (“Middle”), and one a 30% efficacy (“Worst”) — and that Jill knows these probabilities. If we think 
about Jill’s mental states, we realize she is most likely to choose Best (since Jill believes, correctly, that this 
choice is optimal), but we can also reach this conclusion by merely considering what is optimal in the world, 
since Jill’s mental states track the world. That is, when an agent’s beliefs match the world, efficiency-based 
thinking is a useful shortcut for predicting behavior. This is why most game theory models assume optimal 
decision-making from one’s opponents (e.g., Morgenstern & von Neumann, 1947; Nash, 1951).  
However, there are some situations where normative prediction requires us to override the Efficiency 
Principle — cases in which the agent is ignorant of key information. For example, imagine that Jill is in the 
same situation as before, but falsely believes that all three shampoos are equally likely to achieve her goal. In 
Optimality Bias in Moral Judgment 5 
this case, our representational theory-of-mind tells us that Jill is equally likely to choose each of the three 
brands, since she has no reason to choose one over the others. Yet, the Efficiency Principle says that Jill 
would behave optimally relative to the true situational constraints, not relative to her representation of those 
constraints — she would be likely to choose the 70% option, and unlikely to choose the other two options. 
Surprisingly, even adults are susceptible to such efficiency-based thinking, which can override theory-of-
mind. People believe that Jill, even when ignorant about the relevant probabilities, is most likely to choose 
the optimal (70%) option, and less likely to choose the suboptimal (50% or 30%) options (Johnson & Rips, 
2014). Critically, people also believe that Jill is equally likely to choose each of the suboptimal (50% and 30%) 
options; hence, their predictions track optimality as such, rather than the objective probability of success. 
This stands in contrast both to normative mental-state inferences (i.e., Jill is equally likely to choose each 
option) and to the predictions people make for agents who do know the probabilities (i.e., she is more likely 
to choose Best than Middle, but also more likely to choose Middle than Worst). Thus, this stepwise pattern of 
responses — higher predictions for optimal choices, but roughly equal predictions among different 
suboptimal choices — is a unique signature of efficiency-based reasoning about ignorant agents. This 
pattern has been found in both predictions of behavior as well as explanations: People believe that 
suboptimal choices are more in need of explanation than optimal choices because such choices violate our 
expectations about optimal behavior, eluding the efficiency-based schema we can typically apply (Johnson & 
Rips, 2014). 
Optimality and morality. These findings led us to predict that suboptimal actions would also lead to 
(non-normatively) harsher moral judgments, in light of people’s belief that suboptimal choices are more in 
need of explanation (Johnson & Rips, 2014). This hypothesis follows from several streams of research. 
First, people feel muted affect toward events that are explained (Wilson & Gilbert, 2008) — that is, if 
they can (intrapersonally) assign meaning to that event. In one study, students studying in the library 
unexpectedly received a dollar coin attached to an index card. The students maintained a positive mood for 
a shorter duration when the index card contained text explaining why they had received the gift, compared 
Optimality Bias in Moral Judgment 6 
to when the text on the card eluded explanation (Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005). This logic 
applies to negative events too. Participants encouraged to focus on “why” rather than “what” when recalling 
an angering experience were less likely to experience negative affect (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). For 
this reason, people faced with bereavement can cope better with their loss if they are able to find meaning in 
the death of their loved one (e.g., Bonanno et al., 1992). 
Second, affective evaluations are closely linked with moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, 
Bramati, & Grafman, 2002). This leads to the prediction that merely understanding a behavior (thereby 
muting affect) can make that behavior seem more consistent with moral norms and less blameworthy — as 
documented in several studies. For example, when mental disorder symptoms are ordered in a coherent 
causal chain, people rate individuals with those symptoms as less abnormal (Ahn, Novick, & Kim, 2003; 
Meehl, 1973). Likewise, jurors are less likely to convict defendants when the defense can tell a coherent 
story using a given set of facts (Pennington & Hastie, 1992), and people are more likely to be seen as lying 
when they engage in unusual behaviors — even if the behaviors are irrelevant to deception (Bond et al., 
1992). These findings all point to the same underlying phenomenon — when behaviors can be readily 
explained and meaning can be easily assigned, these behaviors are seen as more typical, more normative, and 
less blameworthy; conversely, when there is no available explanation for behaviors, they are seen as less 
normative and more blameworthy. 
Third, we can ask what are the key antecedents to the feeling that an explanation is needed (e.g., 
Bruckmüller et al., 2017; Legare, 2012). In addition to lack of a causal chain (Ahn et al., 2003) or coherent 
order (Pennington & Hastie, 1992), we add perhaps the most critical antecedent of all — violation of 
expectations. Humans constantly predict the future and modify those predictions in light of actual events 
(Bar, 2007; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). For this reason, people are strongly motivated to explain divergences 
from predicted behavior (Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010; Wong & Yudell, 2015). As we noted earlier, 
people expect others to behave optimally, even when ignorant of critical information, which in turn leads 
people to find suboptimal behavior less readily explained than optimal behavior (Johnson & Rips, 2014).  
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Now we can put these ideas together. When an agent behaves suboptimally, people find that behavior 
difficult to explain because it violates their expectations — it does not conform to the optimal choice 
schema and resists attempts to make meaning of it. This feeling leads to more pronounced affective 
reactions to suboptimal choices, corresponding to more severe moral judgments. We thus predicted an 
optimality bias in evaluations of moral decisions, which would be mediated by the presence or absence of a 
coherent explanatory schema. Following previous work (Ahn et al., 2003; Johnson & Rips, 2014), we 
measure this explanatory gap by asking participants to indicate the extent to which they feel that an 
explanation is needed for the agent’s behavior: If the agent behaved optimally, then participants should not 
feel that an explanation is needed; if the agent behaved suboptimally, then they should. These explanatory 
judgments should mediate the relationship between optimality and blame (as we test in Study 3). 
Although this hypothesis has theoretical support, it has not been tested. The most closely related studies 
are the many demonstrations of the outcome bias (e.g., Baron & Hershey, 1988; see also Martin & Cushman, 
2016a), wherein people blame agents for negative consequences despite positive intentions. Both biases are 
examples of behaviorist moral judgment that ignore the moral agent’s mental states, but in quite different 
ways: The outcome bias assigns blame for bad consequences (holding the choice constant), whereas the 
optimality bias assigns blame for suboptimal choices (holding the consequences constant). These biases could 
operate independently. For example, a doctor might be blamed if a patient dies, even if she made the best 
possible choice (outcome bias with no optimality bias). On the other hand, a doctor who unknowingly made 
a suboptimal choice could be blamed even if the patient’s outcome is fine (optimality bias with no outcome 
bias; see Study 4). The biases can also work together — if the patient dies, the doctor could be blamed both 
because of the bad outcome and because she unknowingly made a suboptimal choice. These possibilities are 
not just theoretical — juries must make such decisions everyday in malpractice suits. 
It is important to subject this hypothesis to empirical test, not only because of its practical importance, 
but because there are theoretical reasons that an optimality bias might not occur in moral judgment. Moral 
judgments are other-focused rather than self-focused, yet the optimality bias in conventional judgments is 
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stronger for predicting one’s own choices (Johnson & Rips, under review, Experiment 2). Moral judgments 
usually occur in response to harm, which may strongly motivate blame judgments regardless of the agent’s 
choice (Alicke, 1992; Martin & Cushman, 2016b). Indeed, moral choices differ from conventional choices 
on many key dimensions (e.g., seriousness, generality, authority-independence, and objectiveness; Kumar, 
2015; Turiel, 1983), which have led some to posit domain-specific processes in moral cognition (Cosmides, 
1989; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). For these reasons, Johnson and Rips (2014, 2015) explicitly avoided moral 
stimuli so as not to mix such critically distinct scenarios as medical malpractice and shampoo shopping. 
Finding an optimality bias would inform key debates in moral psychology. First, researchers disagree 
over the relative importance of utilitarian (optimizing the happiness of individuals) versus deontic 
considerations (following moral rules) (e.g., Shenhav & Greene, 2010; Siegel, Crockett, & Dolan, 2017). 
Although utilitarianism is consistent with a difference between optimal and suboptimal outcomes, it would 
predict differences across suboptimal outcomes too (i.e., a 50% chance of a good outcome has higher 
expected utility than a 30% chance, even if a 70% chance would be even better). Because numerical stimuli 
tend to prompt utilitarian judgments (Shenhav & Greene, 2010), an optimality bias would demonstrate a 
violation of utilitarian logic on its home turf. Second, demonstrating the Efficiency Principle in moral 
judgment would complement recent demonstrations that moral psychology depends in part upon more 
domain-general mechanisms (Greene, 2015), including heuristic processes (Sunstein, 2005). Third, use of the 
Efficiency Principle would have important implications for debates over the role of theory-of-mind in moral 
judgment (e.g., Cushman, 2008), since efficiency-based thinking appears to have different psychological 
properties compared to fuller, representational theory-of-mind (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). We return to these 
and other theoretical implications in the General Discussion. 
The current studies. Across seven studies, we test the existence and causes of the optimality bias in 
moral judgment. These studies focus on agents making morally laden decisions in which three potential 
options differ in quality, but agents falsely believe that the options are equivalent. If participants fall prey to 
the optimality bias, they would assign blame based on the quality of the agents’ choices, even though the 
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agents are ignorant. Further, if this thinking is truly based on efficiency rather than mere probability, we 
should expect participants to give more lenient moral judgments only if an agent makes an optimal choice; 
we should not expect moral judgments to differ between suboptimal choices that vary equally in quality. 
Study 1 provides an initial test of this prediction for judgments of wrongness and punishment. Study 2 
seeks to extend the optimality bias to cases in which the agent’s ignorance is both salient and clearly 
justified. Study 3 provides direct evidence for the mechanism, by measuring both need for explanation and 
blame, and then testing our mediation model. Next, we assess the plausibility of alternative accounts by 
testing positive outcomes (Study 4) and by measuring two potential moderators — the agent’s perceived 
negligence and the extent to which participants erroneously attribute knowledge to the agent (Study 5). 
Finally, we examine potential boundary conditions, testing whether the optimality bias persists when the 
agent knows the probabilities (Study 6) and when participants forecast their blame judgments (Study 7). 
 
Study 1: Wrongness and Punishment 
Study 1 examined the optimality bias in judgments of wrongness and punishment. On standard accounts 
of these judgments (Cushman, 2008), wrongness primarily tracks the negativity of an agent’s intentions, and 
punishment primarily tracks the negativity of the outcome caused by the agent. Could both of these 
judgments also be affected by the optimality of an agent’s choice, irrespective of the agent’s knowledge? 
Methods. Participants in all studies were American, and were recruited and compensated using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Relative to traditional samples of undergraduates, Mechanical Turk participants tend to be 
somewhat older and more highly educated, though with high variance (e.g., Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
Thus, these samples would generalize more readily to the American population compared to undergraduate 
samples, although we cannot make statements about cross-cultural stability. Participants provided informed 
consent in accordance with the procedures of the Yale University Human Subjects Committee. For each 
study, participants had not participated in any of the other studies. Sample sizes were planned a priori to 
achieve at least 90% power based on effect size estimates from related studies, before exclusions (for more 
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details, see Appendix S4 in the online Supplementary Materials). In these studies, we report all measures, 
manipulations, and exclusions. 
For Study 1, we recruited 336 participants (Mage = 31, 41% female); 80 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions (see Appendix S5 for exclusion criteria). Previous research found that excluding 
participants who failed comprehension checks can reduce noise in responses due to inattention in online 
studies (Thomas & Clifford, 2017), and our exclusion percentages were within the range of published 
exclusions for data collected on Mechanical Turk (e.g., Thomas et al., 2016; De Freitas et al., 2017). The 
conclusions of significance tests in this article did not generally depend on the exclusion criteria, with 
analyses repeated on the full sample leading to similar results in nearly all cases (see Appendix S5). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight vignettes concerning different moral agents (doctor, 
farmer, contractor, programmer, pilot, paramedic, CEO, or broker). Vignettes were normed on Kumar’s 
(2015) distinctly moral attributes (seriousness, generality, authority-independence, and objectiveness) to 
verify their moral significance, relative to stimuli used in related work (see supplementary Study S1). 
Participants judged agents who made moral decisions under uncertainty, which always led to a negative 
outcome. These agents always had three possible options, having a 70%, 50%, and 30% probability of 
leading to a favorable outcome (we refer to these as Best, Middle, and Worst, respectively). The agent always 
falsely believed, however, that the three options were of the same quality. For example, in the Best condition 
the agent behaved optimally, choosing the option with the highest probability of a positive outcome: 
A doctor working in a hospital has a patient who is having hearing problems. This patient has three, and only three, 
treatment options. The doctor believes that all treatment options have a 70% chance of giving the patient a full, 
successful recovery. But in fact the doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
1) If she gives the patient treatment LPN, there is a 70% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
2) If she gives the patient treatment PTY, there is a 50% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
3) If she gives the patient treatment NRW, there is a 30% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
The doctor chooses treatment LPN, and the patient does not recover at all. The patient now has permanent hearing loss. 
 
The Middle and Worst conditions differed only in which choice the agent made (i.e., PTY or NRW rather 
than LPN). Note that the probabilistic difference between Best and Middle is the same as between Middle 
and Worst, but only Best maximizes the probability of the outcome. That is, Best is the optimal decision, 
Optimality Bias in Moral Judgment 11 
even though the agent has no way of knowing. (See Appendix S1 for the text of other vignettes, Appendix 
S2 for how wording varied across studies, and Appendix S3 for a summary of differences across studies.) 
On the same page, participants in Study 1A answered a question about wrongness (e.g., “How wrong 
was the doctor’s behavior?”) and participants in Study 1B answered a question about punishment (“How 
much should the doctor be punished?”), on a scale anchored at 1 (“not at all”), 4 (“somewhat”), and 7 
(“very much”). The dependent measures were reverse-coded for consistency with other studies. 
On the next page, participants answered two check questions, to ensure comprehension of the vignette. 
To be included, a participant had to correctly indicate the probability of success given the agent’s choice and 
to acknowledge that the agent had a false belief about the probabilities (see Appendix S5 for wordings). 
Results and discussion. Even though the agent thought that the three options were of the same 
quality, participants sharply differed in their moral judgments depending on the agent’s choice (Figure 1). In 
Study 1A, agents who chose the (optimal) Best option were judged as behaving less wrongly than those who 
chose the (suboptimal) Middle option [t(87) = 5.22, p < .001, d = 1.11, 95% CI[1.24,2.76], BF10 > 1000, dS = 
0.61].1 Thus, participants based their judgments of wrongness on the quality of the agent’s choice, even if 
the agent had no way of knowing that choice quality. 
However, judgments of wrongness did not simply track the probability of the outcome. Wrongness 
judgments were no less harsh when agents chose the Middle rather than the Worst option [t(86) = –0.28, p = 
.78, d = –0.06, 95% CI[–0.93,0.70], BF01 = 5.9, dS = 0.59], even though the probabilistic difference between 
                                                
1 We supplement all t-tests reported in this paper with three pieces of information: (1) a 95% CI on the 
condition difference being tested. (2) A Bayes Factor (BF) (Rouder et al., 2009). For example, “BF10=4.0” 
means that the data would be 4 times likelier under the alternative hypothesis than under the null 
hypothesis, giving reason to reject the null hypothesis. However, BFs can also quantify evidence in favor of 
a null hypothesis; “BF01=6.0” means that the data would be 6 times likelier under the null than under the 
alternative, giving reason to accept the null hypothesis. The Bayesian analysis assumes JZS priors (Rouder et 
al., 2009), with a scale factor of 1. (3) A sensitivity power analysis, reporting the minimum effect size (dS) 
that would be detectable with 80% power, based on the actual sample size after exclusions. These sensitivity 
analyses generally found that the studies were well-powered to detect a medium-sized effect. In addition, we 
report a meta-analysis (following Study 5) pooling data across studies with nearly 2000 participants. 
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Best and Middle (70% vs. 50%) was the same as that between Middle and Worst (50% vs. 30%). 
Participants did not simply view worse choices as morally wrong, but failing to choose the very best option. 
In Study 1B, participants again wished to punish the agent to differing degrees depending on their 
choice. Agents who chose the Best option were judged less deserving of punishment than those who chose 
the Middle option [t(74) = 3.71, p < .001, d = 0.85, 95% CI[0.60,1.98], BF10 = 64.8, dS = 0.64]. Mirroring 
judgments of wrongness, however, punishment judgments did not differ between agents who chose Middle 
and Worst [t(84) = 1.61, p = .11, d = 0.35, 95% CI[–0.14,1.30], BF01 = 1.8, dS = 0.66]. Thus, punishment 
judgments too are affected not only by the negativity of the outcome caused by the agent, but also by the 
optimality of the agent’s choice. Once again, the pattern of judgments showed a strong effect of optimality 
(the Best–Middle difference) but little residual effect of probability (the Middle–Worst difference). 
 
Figure 1. Results of Study 1. 
 
Note. Bars represent 1 SE. Scales reverse-coded. 
 
These results show that for two different moral judgments, people make more lenient judgments for 
agents making optimal decisions, even if they have no way of knowing which decision is optimal. These 
findings provide evidence for a moral optimality bias — a tendency to base moral judgments on the optimality 
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of a decision over-and-above the agent’s mental states. Further, people do not make more lenient 
evaluations for better rather than worse suboptimal decisions, but regard all suboptimal decisions as equally 
wrong and punishable, in accordance with the Efficiency Principle (Dennett, 1987; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). 
However, various concerns about this result are possible. First, participants could have assigned 
culpability not for making the wrong choice, but for being ignorant. A doctor, for example, might be 
deemed negligent if she does not know the risks associated with various procedures. This cannot fully 
account for our findings, because the doctor was ignorant even when she chose the Best option. Nonetheless, we 
would expect the optimality bias to generalize to cases in which the agent could not reasonably be expected 
to know the risks associated with the different options. Studies 2 and 5 address this issue.  
Second, participants could have been making judgments about competence rather than morality. The 
word “wrong” aggravates this issue, as it applies equally to immoral and incompetent choices. This concern 
is mitigated by the similarity between punishment and wrongness judgments and by participants’ beliefs that 
the scenarios reflect distinctly moral behaviors (see supplementary Study S1).  Nonetheless, it would be 
more convincing yet if the optimality bias turned up in other indices of moral judgment, such as judgments 
of blame or character, which more clearly track moral evaluations. Although we would expect a priori that 
the optimality bias would track all of these measures (see Cushman, 2008 for evidence that they are 
impacted by similar factors), we generalize these results further to judgments of blame in subsequent studies.  
 
Study 2: Salient Ignorance about Unknowable Risks 
Study 2 sought to buttress the findings of Study 1 in two primary ways. First, decision situations in real 
life are often associated not only with probabilistic risk (i.e., a specific probability is associated with each 
option) but also with ignorance about those risks themselves (see Knight, 1921 on a related distinction in 
economics). In such situations, one may be not only ignorant about the risks, but necessarily ignorant. A 
pharmaceutical company testing a new drug may justifiably have tremendous uncertainty about the probable 
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effects of an experimental treatment; an economic policy-maker may be poorly equipped to assess the 
effects of various possible changes to regulatory structure or fiscal policy. We simulated such situations in 
our studies by specifying that the risks were unknowable. Thus, for reasons entirely out of their control, 
agents had false beliefs about the risks of each option. In addition to generalizing to such cases of radical or 
Knightian uncertainty, this change addresses the concern from Study 1 that participants may have been 
blaming agents for their ignorance itself. When the risks are in fact unknowable despite agents’ due 
diligence, the agents could not plausibly be held as negligent. 
Second, in the real world, a moral agent’s ignorance is often on full display and at the center of moral 
debate. For instance, during the L’Aquila earthquake incident, the impossibility of predicting earthquakes 
was generally conceded. Nonetheless, people seem to continue to use states of the world to which the agent 
does not have epistemic access, even when that lack of access is salient. Study 2 tested this possibility by 
highlighting the agent’s lack of knowledge (and the impossibility of such knowledge) prior to asking 
participants to make a blame judgment. We did this by asking participants to complete multiple choice 
check questions about the agent’s state of knowledge before the blame measure rather than after. This 
manipulation should focus participants’ attention on the agent’s lack of access to the relevant information. 
Nonetheless, we predicted that participants’ moral judgments would be affected by the choice’s optimality.   
Methods. We recruited 329 participants (Mage = 33, 49% female); 39 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. The procedure was similar to Study 1, except for the following changes. First, 
the vignette text was altered to include stipulations that the agents had done due diligence and that their 
beliefs were rational given the available evidence. For example: 
A doctor working in a hospital has a patient who is having hearing problems. This patient has three, and only 
three, treatment options. Based on many articles that the doctor has carefully read in respected medical 
journals, she truly believes that all three options have a 70% chance of giving the patient a full, successful 
recovery. In fact, all of the existing evidence says that this belief is correct. But as it happens, for reasons 
completely outside of her control, the doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
1) If she gives the patient treatment LPN, there is a 70% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
2) If she gives the patient treatment PTY, there is a 50% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
3) If she gives the patient treatment NRW, there is a 30% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
The doctor chooses treatment LPN, and the patient does not recover at all. The patient now has permanent 
hearing loss. 
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Second, the check questions were included on the same page as the vignette. An additional check 
question was included about the knowability of the probabilities; participants were included only if they 
acknowledged that the agent’s false belief was outside of her control (see Appendix S5). Third, the moral 
judgments were then made on the following page, with the vignette reproduced at the top of the page. The 
dependent measure was blame rather than wrongness or punishment, and was measured on a scale from 1 
(“extreme blame”) to 9 (“extreme praise”), with the vignette reproduced at the top of the page. 
Results and discussion. Even though participants had just acknowledged explicitly that the agent did 
not know—and could not know—the probabilities, they nonetheless blamed agents in accordance with the 
Efficiency Principle. Blame judgments were more favorable for agents choosing Best rather than Middle 
[t(195) = 2.11, p = .036, d = 0.30, 95% CI[0.03,0.74], BF01 = 1.1, dS = 0.40; Figure 2], but did not differ 
between Middle and Worst [t(190) = 1.16, p = .25, d = 0.17, 95% CI[–0.15,0.59], BF01 = 4.6, dS = 0.40]. 
Coupled with Study 1, these results indicate a highly robust moral optimality bias. Participants continued 
to hold agents more responsible after choosing suboptimally, despite (a) the stipulation in the vignette that 
the probabilities were both unknown and unknowable; (b) including in the analysis only participants who 
acknowledged these stipulations; and (c) these acknowledgements being highly salient to participants when 
making their judgments, since they were made immediately prior to the moral judgments.  
To what extent would these results generalize to the real world? One concern may be the stipulation in 
the vignettes that the probabilities were unknowable. Although the internal validity of the experiment 
requires strong constraints on the agent’s ability to learn the true probabilities, we seldom face such strong 
stipulations in the real world. That said, unknowable information is ubiquitous (Knight, 1921). Even in the 
relatively well-defined domain of medical diagnosis, for example, doctors often face novel treatments, novel 
combinations of symptoms, and novel complications. Thus, although explicit stipulations may not often be 
encountered in real life, their underlying reality is all too common. 
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Two other sources of evidence suggest that the optimality bias may be quite general. First, several 
supplementary studies systematically vary features of the vignettes, including outcome (positive, negative, or 
unknown; Studies S3 and S6), intention (positive, neutral, or negative; Study S4), and knowability of the 
probabilities (knowable or unknowable; Study S5). In all cases, we see a substantial difference between the 
Best and Middle conditions and no significant difference between the Middle and Worst conditions — 
precisely the optimality pattern found in Studies 1 and 2 (see Figure S1). Moreover, these factors did not 
moderate the optimality bias. This suggests that the optimality effect is robust across many situations. 
 
Figure 2. Results of Studies 2–5. 
 
Note. Bars represent 1 SE. Scales reverse-coded. 
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Second, the findings were similar across the vignettes. The vignettes varied in the directness of the harm 
and the number of individuals harmed, and to some extent in the severity of the harm (see Table S1). In 
supplementary Study S2, we report analyses in which we try to explain differences in the magnitude of the 
optimality bias across vignettes (collapsing data across all between-subjects studies). This analysis revealed 
that the optimality bias occurred consistently for all eight vignettes, with highly significant differences 
between Best and Middle (see also our internal meta-analysis after Study 5). The differences between Middle 
and Worst were consistently smaller and only approached statistical significance for one vignette. Moreover, 
when we analyzed the relationship between these effect sizes and variability in the directness, severity, and 
number of individuals harmed, there was no statistically reliable relationship. Thus, the optimality bias 
appears to generalize well across very different moral contexts. 
 
Study 3: Need for Explanation as the Mechanism 
We predicted the moral optimality bias based on previous demonstrations of efficiency-based thinking 
about non-moral decisions. People predict that others will behave optimally and, therefore, find it more 
difficult to make sense of suboptimal behaviors, because such behaviors violate expectations and elude their 
(over-extended) explanatory schemas. That is, even when an agent is ignorant about the relevant 
probabilities needed to make a decision, people find optimal choices to be less in need of an explanation 
compared to suboptimal choices (Johnson & Rips, 2014). Based on previous research on affect and moral 
judgment (Ahn et al., 2003; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008), we would expect more extreme affective reactions to 
suboptimal (therefore unexplained) behaviors, accompanied by stronger moral condemnation.  
Study 3 tested this mechanism directly by measuring the extent to which participants thought that an 
explanation was needed for an agent’s behavior (following Johnson & Rips, 2014). We predicted that 
suboptimal moral choices would seem more in need for explanation than optimal choices (but that different 
suboptimal choices would seem equally in need for explanation), and that this difference would mediate the 
relationship between the agent’s choice and blame judgments. 
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Methods. We recruited 160 participants (Mage = 35, 55% female); 44 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. The procedure was identical to Study 2, with two exceptions. First, participants 
answered, “To what extent do you feel that an explanation is necessary for the doctor’s choice?” on a 1-to-9 
scale prior to completing the blame item (on separate pages), analogous to the question used to measure 
need for explanation (Johnson & Rips, 2014) or difficulty of explanation (Ahn et al., 2003) in other research. 
This measure was reverse-coded for analysis and presentation. Second, we presented the comprehension 
questions after these need for explanation and blame questions, rather than before, to address the risk of 
potential demand characteristics associated with presenting the comprehension questions first.  
Results and discussion. Consistent with previous research (Johnson & Rips, 2014), agents’ decisions 
were considered more explainable when they chose Best rather than Middle [t(83) = 2.54, p = .013, d = 0.55, 
95% CI[0.32,2.62], BF10 = 3.0, dS = 0.62; Figure 2] but equally explainable when choosing Middle and Worst 
[t(72) = 0.39, p = .69, d = 0.09, 95% CI[–0.90,1.35], BF01 = 5.2, dS = 0.61]. Replicating Studies 1 and 2, 
agents were also blamed less when they chose Best rather than Middle [t(83) = 2.25, p = .027, d = 0.49, 95% 
CI[0.06,1.04], BF10 = 1.7, dS = 0.62] but equally when choosing Middle and Worst [t(72) = 0.26, p = .79, d = 
0.06, 95% CI[–0.41,0.54], BF01 = 5.4, dS = 0.61]. The effect size in this study (d = 0.49) was larger than in 
Study 2 (d = 0.30) but smaller than in Study 1 (ds = 1.11 and 0.85). 
In preparation for the bootstrap analysis (Preacher & Kelley, 2011), condition was dummy-coded so that 
Best was scored as 1 and Middle and Worst were scored as 0 (we refer to this variable as optimality). 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are in the main text and standardized coefficients in Figure 3. 
There were significant direct effects of optimality on both blame, b = 0.58, 95% CI[0.16,1.00], and need 
for explanation, b = 1.56, 95% CI[0.60,2.52]. When both optimality and need for explanation were entered 
into the model, need for explanation predicted blame, b = 0.18, 95% CI[0.11,0.26], while optimality no 
longer exerted a significant direct effect, b = 0.30, 95% CI[–0.11,0.70]. Critically, the bootstrap results 
indicated a significant indirect effect of optimality on blame via need for explanation, b = 0.28, 95% 
CI[0.10,0.54]. Thus, need for explanation mediates the relationship between optimality and blame (Figure 3). 
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This analysis is consistent with our theoretical account: Suboptimal actions elude explanation, and 
unexplained behaviors are seen as less normative and more blameworthy (Ahn et al., 2003; Pennington & 
Hastie, 1992). Some questions remain, however. First, it would be useful to further test this mechanism 
through experimental manipulations, such as presenting explanations for suboptimal behavior. Second, the 
relationship between explanation and blame is likely bidirectional — perhaps people motivated to assign 
blame latch onto optimality and inexplicability as justifications for blame (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Tetlock, 2002). 
This cannot fully explain the effect of optimality on need for explanation, since this effect is found even in 
non-moral contexts (Johnson & Rips, 2014), but does complicate the theoretical picture beyond the simple 
mediation model presented here. Finally, the mediator explained only about half of the relationship between 
optimality condition and blame. This leaves open the possibility that other mechanisms also partly account 
for the optimality bias, and it would be useful to test alternative mediators. We leave these questions to 
future research, instead focusing here on experimentally testing alternative accounts. 
 
° p < .10            * p < .05            ** p < .01            *** p < .001 
 
Figure 3. Mediation diagram for Study 3. 
 
Note. Coefficients are standardized (unstandardized coefficients given in main text). 
 
Study 4: Inevitable Positive Outcomes 
Study 4 addressed alternative accounts of our findings, by distinguishing between two kinds of 
probability. As in previous studies, the typical probabilities associated with each option varied, and the agent 
either chose the Best, Middle, or Worst option. However, participants also learned about a special 
circumstance that rendered a positive outcome inevitable given any of the choices (e.g., a gene that would 
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render any of the treatments effective). Even though the options varied in their general efficacy (from 70% to 
50% to 30%, as in previous studies), the probability of a positive outcome in this particular case was always 
100%, regardless of the agent’s choice. Our account predicts that people should assign more negative moral 
judgments after a suboptimal choice, since such choices still elude explanation, even if the choice turned out 
not to matter in hindsight. This prediction distinguishes our account from three competitors. 
First, could the results reflect differences in simulated (counterfactual) outcomes for the unrealized 
choices? Participants knew what happened given the agent’s actual choice (always a negative outcome in 
previous studies) but not what would have happened given the other possible choices. In the Best condition, 
participants could imagine a negative outcome had the agent instead chosen Worst, recruiting downward 
counterfactuals (Roese, 1997) and mitigating blame; conversely, in the Worst condition, participants could 
imagine a positive outcome had the agent instead chosen Best, recruiting upward counterfactuals and 
exacerbating blame (Branscombe et al., 2003). If this accounts for the optimality bias, then the bias should 
be eliminated in Study 4, where the counterfactuals are specified and equated across conditions. 
Second, participants could have been assuming that the probabilities were in some sense available to the 
agent, despite the agent’s stated ignorance — that is, participants may have succumbed to hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff, 1975). One version of this concern is the notion that participants could not distinguish their own 
knowledge from that of the agent, an error known as the curse of knowledge (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007; 
Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989) or epistemic egocentrism (e.g., Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003). If 
participants assign blame according to optimality because they tacitly imbue knowledge to the agent or 
otherwise believe agents should optimize their decisions in hindsight, blame should be equal across 
conditions in Study 4 since, in hindsight, the participant — but not the agent — knows that the true 
probability was 100% regardless of the agent’s choice. 
Third, participants could have been succumbing to outcome-based reasoning. One possibility is culpable 
causation (Alicke, 1992) — that participants carefully scrutinized agents’ behavior in light of negative 
outcomes in order to generate reasons for blame, and then latched onto optimality as a scapegoat for 
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motivational reasons. A second possibility is moral luck (Martin & Cushman, 2016b; Nagel, 1979; Williams, 
1981), when an act accompanied by a positive or negative intention (e.g., helping an elderly man to cross the 
road, or attempting to poison one’s husband) by chance has the opposite outcome (e.g., the man trips and 
breaks his hip, or the poison has become impotent with age). In such cases, people often will assign blame 
in accordance with the outcome rather than the agent’s intention (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Martin & 
Cushman, 2016a, 2016b; see also Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003). These mechanisms are theoretically 
compatible with our own explanation for the optimality bias. Since our studies kept the outcome constant 
across conditions, these outcome-based factors could at best be a necessary condition for the optimality 
bias. This would imply a boundary condition: The optimality bias should be eliminated when the agent has a 
positive intention and a positive outcome occurs, as in Study 4, since there is no negative outcome to trigger 
culpable causation and no mismatch between intention and outcome to generate moral luck. If these 
outcome-based processes operate by-and-large separately from optimality, however, the bias should persist. 
Methods. We recruited 174 participants (Mage = 37, 55% female); 21 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. The procedure for Study 4 was identical to Study 2, except for two changes. 
First, the outcome was positive. Second, on the page following the presentation of the initial vignette and 
check questions, the phrase “Here the is the story again, with new information presented in italics” was 
written in bold at the top of the page and the hindsight information was written at the bottom of the page in 
italics, indicating that the outcome would have actually been positive regardless of the choice (e.g., “We now 
also know that the patient had a gene that would have allowed any treatment to cure the disease”). That is, 
participants received probability information in two steps — first, as in previous studies, participants learned 
about the typical probabilities associated with the treatment options (unbeknownst to the agent); and 
second, unlike previous studies, participants learned about an idiosyncratic moderating factor (e.g., the gene) 
that rendered a positive outcome inevitable. Judgments of moral blame were made on the bottom of the 
second page, after the presentation of the hindsight information, using the same scale as Studies 2 and 3. 
Optimality Bias in Moral Judgment 22 
Results and discussion. In Study 4, a positive outcome inevitably occurred, but the options differed in 
efficiency. Thus, the Efficiency Principle predicts that agents should receive more positive moral evaluations 
when they choose optimally. Indeed they did. Like Studies 1–3, participants gave more positive moral 
evaluations when the agent chose Best rather than Middle [t(99) = 3.38, p = .001, d = 0.67, 95% 
CI[0.42,1.60], BF10 = 25.6, dS = 0.56; Figure 2], but similar moral evaluations whether the agent chose 
Middle or Worst [t(100) = 0.42, p = .67, d = 0.08, 95% CI[–0.45,0.69], BF01 = 6.0, dS = 0.57]. Once again, 
the optimality effect was large, while the residual effect of probability was negligible. 
This result is compatible with our account of the optimality bias, but inconsistent with many other 
possibilities, including counterfactual comparison, hindsight bias, epistemic egocentrism, culpable causation, 
and moral luck. Indeed, supplementary Study S3 directly compares the magnitude of the optimality bias for 
positive and negative outcomes, and finds similar effect sizes, further speaking against the impact of 
culpable causation and moral luck as necessary conditions, which would predict that the effect should be 
smaller or eliminated for positive outcomes. 
 
Study 5: Negligence and Egocentric Knowledge Attributions 
Study 5 examines two possible moderators of the optimality bias, to further rule out two concerns raised 
earlier. First, people sometimes hold others accountable not in spite of their ignorance, but because of it, in 
situations of negligence. That is, agents sometimes have duties to take due diligence to ensure they know all 
relevant information that is available. Although Studies 2–4 stipulated that knowledge of the outcome 
probabilities was impossible, participants may have more tacitly assumed the possibility of such knowledge. 
By measuring these attributions of negligence on a continuous scale, Study 5 can test whether these more 
tacit attributions — held in the face of explicit stipulations — contribute to the optimality bias. 
Second, participants may have tacitly imbued the agent with knowledge of the probabilities, confusing 
their own perspective with that of the agent. In that case, participants would have given lower blame 
judgments in the Middle and Worst conditions than in the Best condition because they could not fully 
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discount their knowledge of the probabilities, even though they knew that the agents lacked that knowledge. 
Although this account would seem to predict no optimality bias in Study 4 (where the participant knew the 
true probabilities were 100%), Study 5 further tests the possible moderating influence of egocentrism on the 
optimality bias by measuring these egocentric attributions on a continuous scale. 
 
Methods. We recruited 363 participants (Mage = 35, 57% female); 87 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. The procedure was similar to Study 3, except the explanation question was not 
included and two moderators were measured (order counterbalanced) after the blame question, with the 
vignette text reproduced at the top of the screen. Measures of negligence (“While answering the question 
about blame, did you think that if the doctor had thought more carefully or done more research, then she 
would have been able to know which options were better and which were worse?”) and egocentrism (“While 
answering the question about blame, did you think that the doctor had some sense of which options were 
better and which were worse?”) were on scales from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“definitely”). 
Results and discussion. Participants again blamed agents based on the optimality of their choices. As 
in Studies 1–4, blame scores were significantly less severe in the Best condition than in the Middle condition 
[t(179) = 4.54, p < .001, d = 0.68, 95% CI[0.53,1.36], BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.43; Figure 5], but similar in the 
Middle and Worst conditions [t(188) = 0.29, p = .77, d = 0.04, 95% CI[–0.36,0.49], BF01 = 8.5, dS = 0.41]. 
Our main concern was with the potentially moderating effects of negligence and egocentric knowledge 
attributions. To test these effects, we conducted a stepwise linear regression predicting blame ratings. Model 
1 included a dummy-coded optimality variable (Best condition = ‘1’, other conditions = ‘0’), as well as both 
moderators (centered at their means and scaled by their standard deviations). Model 1 confirmed that 
optimality was a large, significant predictor of blame [b = 0.59, SE = 0.16], indicating that the optimality bias 
operates over-and-above the (main) effects of negligence and egocentric knowledge attributions. 
Egocentrism also predicted blame judgments over-and-above the other predictors [b = –0.75, SE = 0.08], 
although negligence did not have a significant effect [b = –0.10, SE = 0.08]. 
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Model 1 looked at only the main effects of each predictor, but we were especially interested in 
moderating effects. That is, was the effect of optimality larger for participants higher on negligence or 
egocentric knowledge attributions? If so, this would fuel alternative interpretations of our findings. Model 2 
tested this possibility by including all two-way interaction terms as well as the three-way interaction (Table 
1). None of these interactions approached significance (ps > .25), and the overall fit of Model 2 was not a 
significant improvement over Model 1 [R2 = .35 vs. .34; F(4,268) = 0.68, p = .60]. Thus, attributions of 
negligence or egocentric knowledge do not appear to play an important role in the optimality bias. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
DV: Blame Judgments 
(Intercept) 3.91 (0.09) 3.95 (0.10) 
Optimality (dummy) 0.59 (0.16) *** 0.59 (0.17) *** 
Negligence –0.10 (0.08) –0.02 (0.10) 
Egocentrism –0.75 (0.08) *** –0.82 (0.09) *** 
Optimality x Negligence  –0.14 (0.18) 
Optimality x Egocentrism  0.20 (0.18) 
Negligence x Egocentrism  –0.10 (0.09) 
Optimality x Negligence x 
Egocentrism  0.11 (0.17) 
R2 .34 .35 
° p < .10            * p < .05            ** p < .01            *** p < .001 
N = 276 observations 
 
Table 1. Tests of moderation in Experiment 5. 
Note. Models of blame judgments, using as predictors a dummy-coded condition variable, 
continuous measures of potential negligence and egocentrism moderators (mean-centered, 
SD-scaled), and their interactions. Entries are regression coefficients (SEs in parentheses). 
 
Finally, we can use the model to estimate the effect of optimality for a participant one standard 
deviation above or below the mean on negligence and egocentrism (by re-centering the moderators at 1 SD 
above or below the mean on each variable and testing the coefficient on the optimality variable). This allows 
us to ask whether a hypothetical participant who resisted attributions of negligence and egocentric 
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knowledge would still show an optimality bias. The model indicates that they would indeed. A participant 
one SD below the mean on both negligence and egocentrism is estimated to have a significant optimality 
bias (i.e., significantly positive coefficient on the dummy-coded condition variable) [b = 0.65, SE = 0.27, p = 
.019], as is a participant one SD above the mean on both measures [b = 0.77, SE = 0.36, p = .035]. 
These results show that attributions of negligence and egocentric knowledge are not important 
moderators of the optimality bias — the effect is roughly equal in magnitude regardless of how a participant 
scores on these measures. This further rules out the concern that participants are assigning blame for  
ignorance itself rather than suboptimal choices. In addition, it addresses the alternative explanation that the 
optimality bias is driven by a curse of knowledge effect, such that participants are unable to separate their 
own perspective from that of the agent. Although such effects no doubt occur — indeed, blame was higher 
overall for participants who made more egocentric knowledge attributions — this did not interact with the 
optimality bias. Thus, the mechanism identified in Study 3 — the intuition of norm-violation triggered by 
the difficulty of explaining suboptimal actions — appears to be the primary driver of the optimality bias. 
 
Meta-Analysis 
These studies have consistently found a large and significant effect of optimality, as measured by the 
difference in moral judgments between the Best and Middle conditions, and a small and nonsignificant 
effect of probability beyond optimality, as measured by the difference in moral judgments between the 
Middle and Worst conditions. However, although these studies are well-powered for detecting the large 
optimality (Best–Middle) effect (see Appendix S4), they would be individually under-powered for detecting a 
smaller probability (Middle–Worst) effect. In addition, we have not attempted to directly compare the sizes 
of the Best–Middle and Middle–Worst differences, but only their significance levels. As the mantra goes, the 
difference between significant and non-significant may not itself be significant. 
To address these issues, we conducted an internal meta-analysis on our between-subjects studies. This 
includes Studies 1–5 in the main text, as well as supplementary Studies S3A, S3B, S4A, S4B, S5A, S5B, and 
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S6. (Study S3C was not included because we had predicted a significant Middle–Worst difference in that 
study, though in fact that effect reached only marginal significance.) These studies include 1895 participants.  
We conducted the meta-analysis using the METAFOR package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). The 
standardized mean difference was calculated for each study, both for the Best–Middle and the Middle–
Worst difference. Then, these differences were meta-analyzed using a fixed effects model. (Significance 
levels are robust to various random effects specifications.) Unsurprisingly, this analysis uncovered a large 
Best–Middle difference, consistent with the previous studies, b = 0.72, SE = 0.06, z = 12.33, p < .001, 95% 
CI[0.60,0.83]. This is a canonically medium to large effect, since this result is expressed in standardized units. 
There was also a significant Middle–Worst difference, b = 0.14, SE = 0.06, z = 2.54, p = .011, 95% 
CI[0.03,0.25]. Even at the high end of the confidence interval, this effect is small, but nonetheless detectable 
in this very large sample. Finally, since the confidence intervals on these differences do not overlap, we 
conclude that the Best–Middle difference is significantly larger than the Middle–Worst difference. 
These meta-analytic results support the argument we have been making. First, they confirm that there is 
a large and statistically robust effect of optimality on moral judgment: People assign substantially less blame 
to agents who have made an optimal rather than a suboptimal choice. Second, the results confirm that this 
effect occurs over-and-above the effect of probability, since the (equally probabilistically large) gap between 
the agent’s Middle and Worst choices corresponds to a far smaller difference in blame. 
In addition, these results do suggest that there is some modest effect of probability over-and-above 
optimality, since the agents were indeed blamed more in the Worst than in the Middle condition. An 
interesting possibility for future work would be to test whether this effect is due to the qualitatively distinct 
nature of a worst choice. Perhaps even this small effect would be eliminated if participants were assigning 
blame to the second-best versus third-best choice, when there is also a fourth-best choice that is even worse. 
 
Study 6:  Knowledgeable versus Ignorant Agents 
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From a rational perspective, it is surprising that people would blame ignorant agents for making 
suboptimal choices, since these agents did not intend to choose a suboptimal choice and had no principled 
way to make a better choice. On the other hand, it would be surprising if people did not blame knowledgeable 
agents for making suboptimal choices. That is, if a doctor knowingly chooses a treatment that fails to 
maximize the patient’s chance of recovery, then the doctor is reasonably regarded as culpable for a bad 
outcome. Study 6 directly compares the effect of optimal and suboptimal choices for knowledgeable and 
ignorant agents. This is important for generalizing our results to the real world, since an agent’s knowledge 
is often ambiguous. Blame attributions for clearly knowledgeable agents should produce an upper-bound for 
ambiguous cases, while blame attributions for clearly ignorant agents should produce a lower-bound. 
This design also allows us the opportunity to test a further prediction of our process account. We have 
found so far that participants do rely on probability in assigning blame, over-and-above optimality, albeit to 
a very small degree that is undetectable in individual studies. This was revealed by our meta-analysis that 
found a small difference between the Middle and Worst conditions when pooling the data across studies. 
However, in past work examining explanations and predictions of behavior (Johnson & Rips, 2014), people 
robustly relied on probability when making inferences about knowledgeable agents. That is, the choices of 
agents who did know about the probabilities were seen as much more in need for explanation given the 
Middle than the Best choice (i.e., an effect of optimality), but also as somewhat more in need for explanation 
given the Worst than the Middle choice (i.e., an effect of probability). Given our finding that need for 
explanation mediates blame judgments, we would predict that blame judgments for knowledgeable agents 
should follow a similar pattern: Much more severe blame for the Middle choice than for the Best choice, but 
also somewhat more severe blame for the Worst choice than for the Middle choice. 
Study 6 adopts a within-subjects design, with each participant responding to all three choice conditions 
for either ignorant agents (Study 6A) or for knowledgeable agents (Study 6B). In addition to comparing 
judgments for different types of agents, this allows us to test whether efficiency-based thinking would hold 
up in a design which allows participants to compare their responses for internal consistency. 
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Methods. We recruited 191 participants (Mage = 35, 40% female); 51 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. The vignettes were the same as in Study 5, except that two vignettes (jet pilot 
and paramedic) were randomly omitted to facilitate counterbalancing. In Study 6A, the vignettes specified 
that the agents did not know these probabilities, as in previous studies, whereas in Study 6B, the vignettes 
specified that the agent did know the probabilities. Each participant read three different vignettes in a 
within-subjects design, one each where the agent chose Best, Middle, and Worst. The order of the items was 
randomized, and the assignment of vignette to choice condition was counterbalanced. For each vignette, 
participants answered both a question about blame (similar to previous studies) and wrongness (similar to 
Study 1A). The dependent measures in Studies 6 and 7 were coded for consistency with the other studies. 
Results and discussion. The results were similar for wrongness and blame, so we collapsed across 
these variables for analysis (see Figure 4 for the means broken down by measure). 
The results for ignorant agents in Study 6A were similar to those of previous studies. Agents who chose 
Best were deemed less culpable than agents who chose Middle [t(63) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 0.70, 95% 
CI[0.65,1.65], BF10 = 699.3, dS = 0.36], replicating the optimality bias. Yet, agents who chose Middle were 
only blamed marginally less than those who chose Worst [t(63) = 1.87, p = .066, d = 0.21, 95% CI[–
0.02,0.73], BF01 = 1.9, dS = 0.36]. Similar to previous studies (as quantified by the meta-analysis), the Best–
Middle difference was significantly larger than the Middle–Worst difference [t(63) = 2.26, p = .027, d = 0.45, 
95% CI[0.09,1.50], BF10 = 1.1, dS = 0.36]. Thus, even when participants experience all three conditions of 
the experiment, they continue to apply the Efficiency Principle and produce an optimality bias. 
The results for knowledgeable agents in Study 6B were markedly different. Agents who chose Best were 
judged far more leniently than those who chose Middle [t(80) = 15.73, p < .001, d = 2.46, 95% CI[3.12,4.02], 
BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.32]. This optimality effect was far larger than those found in previous studies, perhaps 
not surprisingly since those who chose Middle were knowingly choosing an inferior option. Of greater 
interest, participants also gave significantly harsher judgments to agents choosing Worst rather than Middle 
[t(80) = 6.38,  p <.001, d = 0.88, 95% CI[0.76,1.46], BF10  > 1000, dS = 0.32]. Unlike previous studies of 
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ignorant agents where this effect was so small as to be undetectable in an individual study, it was of large 
magnitude for knowledgeable agents. However, this effect of probability (Middle–Worst) was significantly 
smaller than the optimality effect (Best–Middle) [t(80) = 7.10, p < .001, d = 1.35, 95% CI[1.77,3.15], BF10 > 
1000, dS = 0.32]. This difference in effect sizes is consistent with the differences in need for explanation 
found for knowledgeable agents in prior work (Johnson & Rips, 2014), confirming a prediction of our 
process account. Both differences (Best–Middle and Middle–Worst) were significantly larger for the 
knowledgeable agents of Study 6B than for the ignorant agents of Study 6A [t(143) = 7.13, p < .001, d = 
1.19, 95% CI[1.75,3.09], BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.36 and t(143) = 2.95, p = .004, d = 0.49, 95% CI[0.25,1.27], 
BF10 = 7.5, , dS = 0.36, respectively]. These differences in the response pattern across Experiments 6A and 
6B led to a significant interaction between experiment and condition [F(2,286) = 56.11, p < .001]. 
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Figure 4. Results of Studies 6 and 7. 
 
Note. Bars represent 1 SE. Scales reverse-coded. 
 
Overall, Study 6 has three take-aways. First, participants’ moral judgments are sensitive both to 
optimality and to probability for knowledgeable agents, and both effects are highly robust. (The effect of 
probability for ignorant agents, in contrast, is extremely small and difficult to detect.) This confirms a 
prediction made by our mediation model, since previous work has found that people use both optimality 
and probability when explaining (non-moral) choices (Johnson & Rips, 2014). Second, the effect of 
optimality for knowledgeable agents is larger than the effect of mere probability, with a far larger Best–
Middle difference than Middle–Worst difference. This is again consistent with predictions, since the 
explainability gap between Best and Middle choices is larger than the explainability gap between the Middle 
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and Worst choices (Johnson & Rips, 2014). Together, these results imply that people are sensitive to the 
Efficiency Principle for knowledgeable as well as for ignorant agents. This is important for establishing the 
generality of the Efficiency Principle in moral judgment, since often people do have some sense of the 
quality of decision options, and the difference in effect sizes between knowledgeable and ignorant agents 
gives some sense of the bounds of the effect for realistic cases where the agent’s knowledge is ambiguous. 
 
Study 7: Are People Aware of Using the Efficiency Principle? 
People often mispredict how they will behave because their intuitive theories of behavior are often 
incorrect (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Do participants hold accurate intuitive theories of their moral 
judgments that appeal to the Efficiency Principle? Or do they instead believe that they rely on other 
principles for assigning blame to ignorant moral agents? Study 7 tested this question by asking participants 
to predict how they would judge agents who made each of the three choices. 
Methods. We recruited 96 participants (Mage = 33, 55% female); 19 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. The vignettes were the same as those used in Study 6A. However, rather than 
judging the agent given a single choice and outcome, participants were asked how they would respond if the 
agent made each of the three possible choices and a negative outcome occurred. For each vignette, 
participants were asked to “Imagine that the doctor chose treatment [LPN/PTY/NRW], and that the 
patient did not recover at all, suffering permanent hearing loss. What would the doctor deserve to receive 
for her behavior?” for each of the three options of the same vignette. These three judgments were all made 
on the same screen, in a random order, using the same blame measure as previous studies. 
Results and discussion. People appear to not be aware of using the Efficiency Principle in moral 
judgment, but interestingly, some participants did seem to be aware that their judgments would depend on 
the agent’s knowledge (see “Individual Differences” below). On average, participants distinguished among 
all three options [t(76) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.43, 95% CI[0.28,0.89], BF10 = 66.5, dS = 0.32 for Best versus 
Middle; t(76) = 5.04, p < .001, d = 0.40, 95% CI[0.35,0.82], BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.32 for Middle versus Worst; 
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Figure 4]. This result suggests that people cannot accurately forecast their moral judgments about ignorant 
moral agents, failing to appreciate the importance of efficiency-based considerations in blame. 
These results inform debates about the introspective access of moral judgment. Theories differ in the 
extent to which they posit inaccessible intuitions or reasoned deliberation as the driving force in moral 
judgment (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). These disagreements may occur in part because 
different principles of moral judgment may differ in their availability to introspection (Cushman, Young, & 
Hauser, 2006). For instance, people can verbalize the principle that harms caused by actions are more 
blameworthy than harms caused by omissions (Baron & Ritov, 1994); yet they rarely verbalize the principle 
that harms are more blameworthy if they are direct effects of an action rather than side effects, even though 
many people’s judgments are in fact influenced by this distinction (Foot, 1967; Royzman & Baron, 2002). 
The Efficiency Principle appears to be another principle that drives moral judgment outside of awareness. 
As a further test of participants’ (lack of) introspective access, supplementary Study S6 asked 
participants to justify their response patterns, allowing participants to choose a justification for their moral 
judgments that either explicitly acknowledged the exculpating quality of the agent’s ignorance (a mentalistic 
justification) or which held that the agent’s ignorance did not excuse their choice (an efficiency-based 
justification). Not only did two-thirds of participants choose the mentalistic justification, but participants 
had an equally large optimality bias regardless of their justification. People appear quite unaware of the 
extent to which the Efficiency Principle drives their moral judgments. 
These results also help to further rule out a possible concern about previous studies — that participants 
were responding to pragmatic implicatures (to use information supplied by the experimenter) or demand 
characteristics (to comply with the experimenter’s intentions). This concern is undercut by the finding that 
participants’ own intuitive theory of the task leads to a different response pattern than what we found in 
previous studies. Together with the fact that the effects were nonlinear (an unlikely pattern for an 
experimenter to demand) and demonstrated in several between-subjects studies (in which participants could 
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not compare conditions), it appears unlikely that demand characteristics and pragmatic implicatures drove 
the effects. 
 
Individual Differences 
Because Studies 6 and 7 manipulated the agent’s choice within-subjects, they allow the opportunity to 
examine individual patterns of responses. Table 2 summarizes the proportion of participants whose 
response pattern for blame judgments was either to differentiate among all three conditions (“All 
Different”) or to give the same response for all three conditions (“All Same”). The condition means are also 
included for those participants who did not fall into either of these response patterns. 
 
Proportion of 
Responses 
 
Means for Uncategorized 
Responses 
All 
Different 
All 
Same Best Middle Worst 
Study 6A (Ignorant) 17.2% 15.6%  4.51 3.81 3.67 
Study 6B (Knowledgeable) 51.9% 3.7%  4.83 2.08 2.08 
Study 7 (Forecasting) 35.1% 37.7%  3.67 3.81 3.62 
 
Table 2. Response patterns in Studies 6 and 7. 
Note. The “Proportion of Responses” columns give the proportion of responses for which either Best > Middle > Worst (“All 
Different”) or for which Best = Middle = Worst (“All Same”) for the blame judgments. The “Means for Uncategorized 
Responses” columns give the mean blame judgments for the participants not categorized into either of the patterns.  
 
These analyses allow us to answer several questions about individual response patterns. First, is the 
optimality bias driven by a subset of participants or do most participants fall prey to this bias? In Study 6A, 
only 15.6% of participants gave similar ratings across the three conditions, and a further 17.2% of 
participants differentiated among all three options. The remaining participants could not be classified into 
either pattern, but these participants’ responses average out to the optimality pattern, with a large gap 
between Best and Middle and smaller gap between Middle and Worst. Thus, the majority of participants 
appear to fall prey to the optimality bias. Overall, 45.3% of participants individually showed the optimality 
bias, differentiating between Best and Middle, with a larger Best–Middle than Middle–Worst difference. 
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Indeed, these analyses underestimate the proportion of participants with this underlying judgment pattern 
because condition was confounded with vignette for individuals (but not at the group level). 
Second, do some participants think in an efficiency-based manner about knowledgeable agents? In Study 
6B, more than half of participants (51.9%) differentiated among all three conditions, while only a tiny 
minority (3.7%) gave the same rating in all three conditions. However, the remaining participants gave 
responses that are efficiency-based, with a very large gap between the Best and Middle conditions, and a 
smaller gap between the Middle and Worst conditions. Overall, fully 64.2% of participants individually 
followed the optimality pattern, by the criteria used above (again, this is an underestimate). Thus, the 
Efficiency Principle seems to govern the blame judgments, even for knowledgeable agents.  
Finally, could a subset of participants have intuited the efficiency-based pattern in the forecasting task? 
In Study 7, the majority of participants either differentiated among all three options (35.1%) or gave 
identical ratings to all three options (37.7%). Unlike Study 6A, where the remaining uncategorized 
participants gave responses averaging out to the efficiency pattern, the uncategorized responses in Study 7 
averaged out to noise, with no systematic differences among the three options. By the criteria used above, 
only 19.5% of participants showed an optimality bias, and this is not an underestimate because vignette was 
not confounded with condition for individual participants in this study. This further buttresses our claim 
that people lack introspective awareness of using the Efficiency Principle. 
 
General Discussion 
These studies show that moral judgments are more favorable for agents who make optimal choices than 
for those who make suboptimal choices — even when agents are ignorant about the quality of their choices 
— yet the degree of suboptimality matters very little (Studies 1–6). This pattern occurred because suboptimal 
choices prevented participants from applying an optimal choice schema to the agents’ behavior, making the 
agents’ choices be seen as more in need for explanation and as correspondingly less morally normative 
(Study 3). This pattern persisted under conditions where other accounts would predict it should not (Studies 
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4 and 5), while it was not observed when participants were asked to forecast their judgments (Study 7), 
suggesting that efficiency-based moral judgment operates outside of awareness. 
In what follows, we discuss what these findings tell us about the relationship between mental-state 
inference and moral judgment, and for several other key issues in moral psychology. 
Moral behaviorism. When we judge someone’s wrongdoing, we do so largely on the basis of what she 
was thinking. Theories of blame account for this key fact in different ways. For example, the path model 
(Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014) holds that social perceivers assign blame based on a decision tree, 
where one of the key decision nodes is the agent’s intentionality (see Shaver, 1985 and Weiner, 1995 for 
related stage-like models). In the dual-systems model (Cushman, 2008), all moral judgments depend 
fundamentally on the agent’s mental states, though some types of judgments (such as wrongness) depend 
much less on causality. In person-centered models (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015), blame judgments 
take account of an agent’s motivation and thus inform judgments of character. 
Yet, we found here that people also rely on states of the world to assign blame, and may even do so by 
overriding or ignoring an agent’s mental states. Even when agents were ignorant about the moral decisions 
they faced, people blamed them more when they behaved suboptimally. Given the agent’s ignorance, this 
suboptimal choice was contingent on the world itself rather than on the agent’s representation of the world. 
This can be considered a species of moral behaviorism, in that people bypass the agent’s mental states to assess 
blame. Since mentalizing behavior is often effortful (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010), we would predict 
variability in the extent of behaviorist moral thinking. In particular, factors that inhibit theory of mind, either 
situationally or dispositionally, should exacerbate behaviorist tendencies such as the optimality bias.  
Other phenomena in moral judgment can also be thought of as examples of behaviorist moral thinking. 
For example, in moral luck phenomena, people blame others for negative outcomes that were not intended, 
and thus the agents’ intentions are ignored (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Berg-Cross, 1975; Cushman, 2008; 
Cushman, Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004; 
Young et al., 2007). Nonetheless, moral luck is distinct from efficiency-based thinking in several ways. Moral 
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luck is based on outcomes (Martin & Cushman, 2016b), whereas the optimality bias can occur even when 
the outcome is positive (Studies 4 and S3b) or even unspecified (Study S6). Moral luck depends on the 
presence and number of upward counterfactuals (Martin & Cushman, 2016a), whereas we found the 
optimality bias even when the counterfactuals are all identical (Study 4). And moral luck tends to show up 
principally in judgments of punishment and blame rather than wrongness, perhaps because it is 
pedagogically useful to punish someone for accidentally causing a bad outcome (Martin & Cushman, 2016b; 
see also Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013), whereas the optimality bias is 
equally robust for judgments of wrongness. Further studies of the potentially additive or interactive effects 
of outcome-based processes (such as moral luck) and efficiency-based processes (such as the optimality 
bias) could be a useful direction for future research.  
Implications for debates in moral psychology. The use of efficiency-based thinking in moral 
judgment, along with other demonstrations of behaviorist moral judgment, demonstrate that moral 
judgment depends on mechanisms other than just mental-state inference. The nature of the efficiency-based 
mechanism demonstrated here is informative for several key debates in moral psychology. 
First, the Efficiency Principle is domain-general: It is used across many different psychological faculties, 
not solely in moral judgment. Researchers have debated the extent to which moral judgment is rooted 
primarily in domain-general mechanisms that are shared across many psychological processes, versus 
domain-specific mechanisms that operate only in the moral domain (Cushman, 2008; De Freitas, Tobia, 
Newman, & Knobe, 2016; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Mikhail, 2007; Shenhav & Greene, 2010; Turiel, 1983; see 
also Greene, 2015). One strategy toward addressing this problem is to test whether particular domain-general 
mechanisms are used in moral judgment, such as causal attribution (Cushman & Young, 2011), 
psychological essentialism (De Freitas, Cikara, Grossmann, & Schlegel, 2017; Newman, De Freitas, & 
Knobe, 2015; Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman, 2017), and language (Costa et al., 2014). The current work 
also falls in this category. People use the Efficiency Principle in other domains of cognition, including 
behavior prediction (Baker, Tenenbaum, & Saxe, 2009; Johnson & Rips, 2015), visual perception (Gao & 
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Scholl, 2011), and language understanding (Davidson, 1967; Grice, 1989). Given that this mechanism is also 
used in moral judgment, the current work highlights another way that moral psychology is rooted in 
domain-general processes, rather than reflecting the operation of a highly domain-specific moral faculty. 
Second, the Efficiency Principle is a heuristic: In the current studies, it is an overextension of the 
otherwise useful rule to assume that people will behave optimally. Some aspects of moral judgment can be 
modelled as the output of a rational process (e.g., Kleiman-Weiner, Gerstenberg, Levine, & Tenenbaum, 
2015), but moral judgments also seem to depend, at least in part, upon heuristics or rules of thumb that can 
sometimes lead us astray in predictable ways (e.g., Sunstein, 2005). Consistent with the latter view, our 
results demonstrate that people blame others for actions they had no way of knowing were suboptimal. 
These judgments occurred because people attempt to apply their “optimal choice” schema for making sense 
of behavior, and assign higher blame to the agent when that schema falls short. Although there is no 
universally agreed on definition of a heuristic (Chow, 2014), the optimality bias seems to qualify on at least 
three conceptions. It qualifies as effort reduction (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008) because it is cognitively 
demanding and computationally intensive to use theory-of-mind, whereas behaviorist work-arounds are less 
effortful. It qualifies as attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), as people substitute a cognitively 
accessible and readily evaluable attribute (coherence or ease of sense-making) for a more difficult judgment 
(normative blameworthiness). And arguably, it qualifies as information exploitation (Chow, 2014; Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999), in that the optimality bias exploits a cue that is usually a good guide to blameworthiness: It is 
only when agents are ignorant that it becomes irrational to assign blame to suboptimal moral choices. Such a 
simple rule may often identify violators of moral norms, but it casts too broad a net and assigns blame to 
those who could not have possibly known better. 
Third, the Efficiency Principle is used outside of awareness. The role of more deliberative versus intuitive 
processes in moral judgments has long been debated by philosophers, and empirical methods have recently 
been brought to bear on this question (Cushman et al., 2006). Contrary to more unitary views, some moral 
principles may be more subject to conscious awareness (such as the action/omission distinction) compared 
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to others (such as the direct/indirect distinction). The current results inform this debate by supplying 
another moral principle that appears to operate outside of awareness. Participants in Study 7 failed to predict 
that their blame judgments would follow an efficiency pattern, and participants in Study S6 often provided 
mentalistic justifications even when their responses were efficiency-based. 
Fourth, the Efficiency Principle is a deontic moral rule. Philosophers and psychologists have disagreed over 
the role of utilitarian criteria for moral judgment and behavior (maximizing the happiness of individuals) 
versus deontic criteria (following a set of rules), with psychologists uncovering a number of moderating 
factors, including emotion, moral character, and egoism (Greene et al., 2001; Kahane et al., 2015, 2018; 
Shenhav & Greene, 2010; Siegel, Crockett, & Dolan, 2017). Because utilitarian and deontic criteria often 
reach similar conclusions, this debate has been difficult to adjudicate. The current findings occupy a unique 
position in this debate. At first glance, the Efficiency Principle may seem highly utilitarian — indeed, a 
reflexive overapplication of utilitarian standards in cases where agents could not possibly follow them — 
because people blame agents less for choosing an option that maximizes the victim’s utility (a 70% chance 
of a positive outcome) over one that does not (a 50% chance). However, efficiency-based blame judgments 
depart sharply from utilitarianism, because such judgments are no harsher for worse suboptimal options (a 
30% chance). Given that numerical information seems to trigger utilitarian judgments (Shenhav & Greene, 
2010), our participants’ use of deontic considerations contradicts utilitarian judgment in precisely the sort of 
situation where it ought to be at its strongest. Given that many moral judgment studies compare two 
options, rather than three or more where the Efficiency Principle is free to emerge, many demonstrations of 
utilitarian judgment may in fact be manifestations of a deeper deontic application of the Efficiency Principle.  
Fifth, and finally, the Efficiency Principle is an explanatory principle. Previous researchers in moral 
psychology have not generally emphasized the importance of explanatory or sense-making processes, aside 
from the important role of theory of mind. We think this is an oversight. Explanatory reasoning — the set 
of processes people use for evaluating hypotheses in light of evidence — is emerging as a key area of 
interest in high-level cognition (Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 2016), and recent work suggests that explanatory 
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reasoning relies on a number of domain-general heuristics. For instance, people favor simpler explanations 
over more complex ones when evaluating causal explanations (Lombrozo, 2007) and categorizing 
individuals (Johnson, Kim, & Keil, 2016), and similar heuristics are even used in some visual tasks (Johnson, 
Jin, & Keil, 2014). Likewise, people favor explanations that do not make unverified predictions in causal 
reasoning and categorization (Johnson, Rajeev-Kumar, & Keil, 2016; Khemlani, Sussman, & Oppenheimer, 
2011; Sussman, Khemlani, & Oppenheimer, 2014) as well as some decision-making contexts (Johnson, 
Zhang, & Keil, 2016). If the relationship between explanation and moral reasoning generalizes beyond the 
current studies — and we have no reason to think it would not — this suggests a variety of roads for new 
empirical and theoretical work at the intersection of moral judgment and high-level cognition. 
Practical implications. It is often difficult to predict the consequences of one’s actions, and so one 
may sometimes make choices that turn out, in retrospect, to be suboptimal. In such situations, these results 
point to a risk that observers will blame actors who are trying their best under conditions of ignorance. 
Legal courts are often responsible for assessing culpability when a defendant was ignorant of some 
important aspects of a situation, as in many cases of medical malpractice (Raghuveer, 2015). Indeed, doctors 
are often faced with the prospect of treating children whose parents demand suboptimal treatments (Nair et 
al., 2017). Such situations place jurors in inherently difficult situations, which are compounded by biases in 
moral judgment such as the optimality and outcome biases. Studying these biases in applied settings such as 
juror decision-making could have great practical import (cf. Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
Likewise, in our lives as consumers, we often experience moral outrage at the behaviors of companies 
(Antonetti & Maklan, 2016), which often devote tremendous resources to minimizing risk to their 
customers but nonetheless are not omniscient. Inevitably, some medications will have unintended side-
effects, some cars will have defects, and some employees will act out. Such perceived failures of corporate 
social responsibility can have grave consequences for companies’ bottom lines, including competitive 
disadvantage, consumer boycotts, and legal or regulatory actions (see Orlitzky et al., 2003 on links between 
profitability and corporate responsibility). Yet, it is not always clear that consumer outrage is fair (e.g., when 
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consumers proposed boycotting Olive Garden restaurants in 2013 simply because the chain’s parent 
company is located in Florida, where the controversial Zimmerman verdict was handed down; Tuttle, 2013). 
Our findings suggest that ignorance may not be a suitable line of defense in such cases; testing alternative 
communications strategies for consumer appeasement may be useful.  
As for the Italian scientists who failed to predict an earthquake, it seems likely that the outrage was 
fueled by rationalizations, built upon judgments ultimately driven by an efficiency-based heuristic. This 
cognitive bias account stands in contrast to many other narratives surrounding the case. Some 
commentators argued that the proceedings reflected Italy’s contempt for scientists (Nature, 2012), or that it 
was the Italian government’s attempt to find a scapegoat (Hall, 2011). For their part, the families of the 
victims — and much of the scientific community — said that the sentence simply did not make any sense 
(Nature, 2012). To create justice in a world of both morally fallible actors and cognitively fallible observers, 
we must first look inward to understand our own biases. 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Study S1: Norming for Moral Distinctiveness 
 Norming Study S1 sought to ensure that participants perceived the vignettes used in the current studies 
as distinctly moral, in opposition to the conventional decision-making dilemmas used in previous research 
(e.g., Johnson & Rips, 2015).  
 
Methods. We recruited 49 participants (Mage = 36, 54% female); 22 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. 
Participants read thirteen vignettes in a random order — the eight vignettes used in the current studies 
and the five vignettes used in a previous study of lay decision theory (Johnson & Rips, 2015), such as the 
item concerning Jill’s choice of shampoo described in the main text. After the description of each dilemma, 
participants were told that the agent deliberately chose the Worst option (e.g., the doctor deliberately 
chooses the option most likely to lead to permanent hearing loss, or Jill deliberately chooses the option least 
likely to make her hair smell like apples). Participants then rated the following (in this order) on scales from 
1 to 9: 
Seriousness. “How seriously wrong is [the doctor’s] action?” 
Universality. “Is it wrong in other places and times?” 
Authority-independence. “Would it still be wrong if someone in authority said it was OK?” 
Objectivity. “Imagine that someone else disagrees with you about whether the action was wrong. Must 
one of you be wrong?” 
Harm. “Does the action lead to serious harm?” 
Items were presented in a random order. 
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Results and discussion. On every measure, all of the morally laden vignettes were rated above the 
scale midpoint and all of the morally neutral vignettes were rated below the scale midpoint. These 
differences were significant for all measures: wrongness [M = 8.48, SD = 0.73 vs. M = 3.38, SD = 2.03; t(26) 
= 12.23, p < .001], universality [M = 8.27, SD = 0.93 vs. M = 3.30, SD = 2.05; t(26) = 12.00, p < .001], 
authority [M = 7.86, SD = 1.61 vs. M = 3.21, SD = 2.11; t(26) = 9.75, p < .001], objectivity [M = 7.84, SD = 
1.28 vs. M = 3.53, SD = 2.47; t(26) = 9.85, p < .001], and harm [M = 8.30, SD = 0.60 vs. M = 1.87, SD = 
1.40; t(26) = 21.87, p < .001]. Thus, the vignettes used in the current study were distinctly moral. 
 
Study S2: Exploring Differences Among Vignettes 
The purpose of Norming Study S2 was to test whether the seriousness of the harm invoked in each 
vignette — measured in terms of severity, directness, and number harmed — can explain differences in the 
size of the optimality bias across vignettes. 
 
Methods. We recruited 38 participants (Mage = 32, 45% female); 4 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. 
Participants read the eight vignettes used in the current studies. After a description of each dilemma, 
participants were told that the agent deliberately chose the Worst option, as in Norming Study S1. 
Participants then rated the following (in this order) on scales from 1 to 9: 
Severity. “How serious were the consequences of the [doctor’s] actions?” 
Directness. “Did the [doctor’s] actions lead to direct, bodily harm?” 
Number. “How many people were harmed because of the [doctor’s] actions?” 
Items were presented in a random order. 
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 Best–Middle 
Middle–
Worst Severity Directness Number 
Doctor 1.20*** 0.30 8.24 7.94 1.62 
Farmer 0.75* 0.19 8.44 8.24 3.97 
Building Contractor 1.08*** 0.21 8.68 8.68 2.79 
Computer Programmer 1.42*** 0.12 8.09 2.09 5.03 
Jet Pilot 1.07*** 0.10 8.68 8.68 2.71 
Paramedic 0.92*** 0.48° 8.76 8.38 1.79 
CEO 1.49*** 0.17 8.65 8.53 3.00 
Investment Banker 0.96** 0.02 8.29 2.21 1.79 
° p < .10            * p < .05            ** p < .01            *** p < .001 
 
Table S1. Item characteristics for each vignette. 
Note. The first two columns give difference scores for each vignette, pooling data across studies, while the last three 
columns give the measurements of moral seriousness from Study S2. Significance levels are indicated for the Best–Middle 
and Middle–Worst comparisons. 
 
Results and discussion. The vignette means for each measure are shown in Table S1, along with the 
mean differences for each comparison (Best–Middle, and Middle–Worst). The latter data were obtained by 
selecting all participants across Studies 1–5 in the main text, as well as supplementary Studies S3A, S3B, 
S4A, S4B, S5A, S5B, and S6 (the same studies used in the meta-analysis presented in the main text). The 7-
point scales used in Study 1  were rescaled to a 9-point scale for consistency. The difference between Best 
and Middle was significant for all 8 vignettes. The difference between Middle and Worst reached marginal 
significance for only one out of the 7 vignettes, but was always numerically positive. This pattern is broadly 
consistent with the meta-analysis presented in the main text, which revealed robust differences between the 
Best and Middle conditions but only very small differences between the Middle and Worst conditions. 
The Best–Middle difference — the measure of the optimality bias — was not significantly associated 
with severity [r(6) = –.24, p = .56], directness [r(6) = –.19, p = .66], or number [r(6) = .28, p = .50]. A 
multiple regression, adjusting for the effects of these variables simultaneously, reaches similar conclusions. 
Of course, strong conclusions about item differences cannot be drawn from a study of 8 vignettes.  
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The Middle–Worst difference also was not significantly associated with severity [r(6) = .40, p = .33], 
directness [r(6) = .53, p = .17], or number [r(6) = –.35, p = .40]. Although these correlations are not highly 
reliable, they are fairly large in magnitude. Perhaps when the harm is sufficiently serious, people are more 
inclined to attend not only to optimality, but also to more fine-grained probability information. This 
conclusion cannot be safely drawn from the current studies — particularly since the difference between 
Middle and Worst did not reach significance for most of the vignettes, taken individually — but is 
suggestive for future research. 
 
Figure S1. Results of Studies S3–S6. 
 
Note. Bars represent 1 SE. Scales reverse-coded. 
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Study S3: Positive and Negative Outcomes 
Although Study 4 demonstrated the optimality bias for positive outcomes, it did so in an unusual 
context where the outcomes are inevitable. Study S3 directly contrasted positive and negative outcomes in 
the more common situation where the outcomes are uncertain ex ante. In addition, this study allowed us to 
compare the magnitude of the outcome bias — the tendency to make harsher moral evaluations in light of 
negative outcomes (Baron & Hershey, 1988) — to that of the optimality bias. 
 
Methods. We recruited 267 participants (Mage = 32, 39% female); 67 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. 
The method was the same as those in Study 1 in the main text (see Appendices S1–3), with three 
changes. First, the outcome was negative for some participants (Study S3A) and positive for others (Study 
S3B). Second, the information about the agent having done due diligence (used in Studies 2–7) was 
included. Finally, the dependent measure was moral blame (as in Studies 2–7). 
 
Results and discussion. When judging the blameworthiness of the agents’ actions for the negative 
outcomes in Study S3A, participants blamed agents choosing Best less than those choosing Middle [t(64) = 
2.86, p = .006, d = 0.71, 95% CI[0.31,1.73], BF10 = 6.5, dS = 0.74; Figure S1], but blamed agents choosing 
Middle no less than those choosing Worst [t(71) = 0.82, p = .42, d = 0.19, 95% CI[–0.40,0.95], BF01 = 4.1, dS 
= 0.67]. Likewise, for the positive outcomes of Study S3B, moral judgments again tracked optimality, with 
more praise assigned to agents choosing Best than Middle [t(61) =  3.57, p = .001, d = 0.90, 95% 
CI[0.61,2.18], BF10 = 40.2, dS = 0.72], but no more praise assigned to agents choosing Middle than Worst 
[t(64) = 1.43, p = .16, d = 0.35, 95% CI[–0.24,1.44], BF01 = 2.1, dS = 0.71]. The interaction between 
experiment and condition was not significant [F(2,194) = 0.85, p = .43], failing to support a moderating 
effect of outcome. Hence, the same efficiency-based mechanisms appear to apply to moral judgments made 
in light of both negative and positive outcomes. 
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Although the patterns were similar for positive and negative outcomes, participants generally produced 
harsher evaluations of an agent’s behavior in light of negative outcomes (Study S3A) than positive outcomes 
(Study S3B), even though the agent could control the outcome only indirectly through her choice [t(198) = 
8.47, p < .001, d = 1.20, 95% CI[1.54,2.47], BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.39], demonstrating a robust outcome bias 
(Baron & Hershey, 1988). Notably, the size of the optimality bias (d = 0.71 for negative outcomes and d = 
0.90 for positive outcomes) approached the size of the outcome bias (d = 1.20). 
Like Study 1, the omission of the unknowability stipulation from these stimuli (as well as those used in 
Study S4) raises important questions of internal validity: Could participants have believed that the agents did 
their research poorly, and hence blamed them for their ignorance? In the absence of strong stipulations 
about unknowability, this remains a possibility. Nonetheless, finding the same pattern as in the main 
experiments for both positive and negative outcomes suggests that the effect generalizes to cases where 
such stipulations are not made, which may better reflect the real world. 
 
Study S4: Positive, Neutral, and Negative Intentions 
One possible concern is that participants view the agents’ choices as reflecting their goals — optimal 
decisions may have signaled a positive intention, whereas suboptimal decisions may not have. In that case, 
the increased blame for the suboptimal agents would reflect blame for the agent’s mental states, not for their 
choice (although it is difficult to see, normatively, how the agents’ positive or negative intentions could have 
driven which of the three options they chose, given their ignorance of the probabilities associated with these 
options). To address this possibility, Study S4A specified that the agent had a positive intention, and Study 
S4B specified that the agent did not have a positive intention (i.e., a “neutral” intention). 
In addition, we examined a potential consequence of our efficiency account. From the moral patient’s 
point of view, the agent’s optimal choice is always Best. However, from the agent’s perspective, the optimal 
choice depends on their intention. For a positively intentioned agent, the optimal choice is Best. But if the 
agent has negative intentions, the Worst option is actually optimal. Thus, perhaps when the agent has a 
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negative intention, participants would distinguish between Middle and Worst — options that are always 
suboptimal from the patient’s perspective, but which differ in optimality from the agent’s perspective. Study 
S4C tested this possibility by specifying that the agent had a negative intention. 
 
Methods. We recruited 503 participants (Mage = 34, 44% female); 202 were excluded because they 
incorrectly answered one or more check questions.  
The method was the same as Study S3A, except that the agent’s intent was specified to be either positive 
(e.g., “The doctor intends to choose the best treatment option for her patient”; Study S4A), neutral (e.g., 
“The doctor does not intend to choose the best treatment option for her patient”; Study S4B), or negative 
(e.g., “The doctor intends to choose the worst treatment option for her patient”; Study S4C). The outcome 
of the agent’s action was always negative. 
 
Results and discussion. Given positive intentions in Study S4A, judgments of blame for the positive 
outcome again tracked optimality, since agents were evaluated more positively if they chose Best than 
Middle [t(76) = 3.54, p = .001, d = 0.80, 95% CI[0.48,1.72], BF10 = 39.5, dS = 0.65; Figure S1], but no 
differently if they chose Middle rather than Worst [t(68) = 0.76, p = .45, d = 0.18, 95% CI[–0.36,0.79], BF01 
= 4.2, dS = 0.63]. Similarly, given neutral intentions in Study S4B, judgments of blame tracked optimality, 
since agents were evaluated more positively if they chose Best than Middle [t(65) = 2.64, p = .010, d = 0.65, 
95% CI[0.24,1.74], BF10 = 4.0, dS = 0.74] but no differently if they chose Middle rather than Worst [t(71) = 
1.09, p = .28, d = 0.25, 95% CI[–0.28,0.94], BF01 = 3.3, dS = 0.66]. Thus, an optimal choice does not 
function merely as a signal of the agent’s unrevealed intention, since the effect occurs even if the intention is 
specified. Comparing the means for Study S4A and S4B reveals a sizeable effect of positive versus neutral 
intention [t(209) = 4.83, p < .001, d = 0.67, 95% CI[0.59,1.40], BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.38]. However, the effect 
size of the optimality bias was, if anything, even larger (d = 0.80 and d = 0.65) than the effect of intention (d 
= 0.67). 
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Unlike for positive and neutral intentions, for negative intentions there is a mismatch in optimality — 
Worst is the optimal choice from the agent’s perspective, whereas Best is the optimal choice from the 
victim’s perspective. Therefore, we predicted (a priori) that this clash in optimalities might cause some sign 
of a stepwise assignments of blame, unlike in the other conditions and the previous studies. Providing some 
evidence for this prediction, participants in Study S4C judged agents with negative intentions as more 
blameworthy when choosing Middle than Best [t(53) = 2.84, p = .006, d = 0.76, 95% CI[0.39,2.27], BF10 = 
6.2, dS = 0.78], but also marginally more blameworthy when choosing Worst than Middle [t(61) = 1.78, p = 
.081, d = 0.45, 95% CI[–0.08,1.38], BF01 = 1.3, dS = 0.76]. However, the interaction between condition and 
experiment was not significant [F(4,292) = 0.54, p = .70], failing to support a moderating effect of intention.  
One possibility is that the manipulation of intention was unsuccessful because participants drew 
exculpatory inferences about why the agents chose the worst option (e.g., maybe the patient desired that the 
doctor act the way she did), although this seems unlikely for many of the vignettes (e.g., it is not very 
plausible that the patient would ask for permanent hearing loss). Whatever the reason for these mixed 
results, they do not allow strong conclusions about intention-based differences in the optimality bias when 
the agent and patient have different optimal choices. Future research might further address the potential role 
of motivations on moral judgments under these particular circumstances. 
 
Study S5: Knowable and Unknowable Probabilities  
Studies 2–6 addressed the issue of perceived negligence (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009) in two 
ways — specifying in all cases that the agent did due diligence to assess the probabilities of the choices and 
that these probabilities were unknowable, and directly measuring attributions of negligence in Study 5. In 
Study S5, we further investigated the role of perceived negligence by comparing cases where the 
probabilities were unknown but knowable to cases where the probabilities were both unknown and 
unknowable. 
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Methods. We recruited 335 participants (Mage = 32, 37% female); 188 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. 
The vignettes were the same as those in Study S3A, except that participants were told either that 
evidence existed indicating that the options had different likelihoods of a positive outcome (knowable 
condition, e.g., “In fact, there is some existing evidence that says this belief is incorrect. As it happens, the 
doctor’s belief is wrong.”; Study S5A) or that no such evidence existed (unknowable condition, e.g., “In fact, 
all of the existing evidence says that this belief is correct. But as it happens, for reasons completely outside 
of her control, the doctor’s belief is wrong.”; Study S5B). 
 
Results and discussion. In Study S5A, when the probabilities were knowable, participants judged the 
agent less harshly when she chose Best rather than Middle [t(70) = 4.46, p < .001, d = 1.05, 95% 
CI[0.80,2.09], BF10 = 656.1, dS = 0.67; Figure S1], but equally harshly whether she chose Middle or Worst 
[t(65) = 1.10, p = .27, d = 0.27, 95% CI[–0.28,0.99], BF01 = 3.1, dS = 0.67]. Likewise, in Study S5B, when the 
probabilities were unknowable, participants again judged the agent less harshly when she chose Best rather 
than Middle [t(27) = 2.20, p = .037, d = 0.82, 95% CI[0.06,1.80], BF10 = 1.8, dS = 1.10], but equally harshly 
whether she chose Middle or Worst [t(28) = –0.72, p = .48, d = –0.26, 95% CI[–1.03,0.49], BF01 = 3.1, dS = 
1.06]. The interaction between condition and experiment was not significant [F(2,141) = 2.02, p = .14], 
failing to support a moderating effect of knowability. Thus, participants in the other studies do not seem to 
have been blaming suboptimal agents for their negligence in failing to know the probabilities, but rather for 
choosing suboptimally. 
The effect of optimality was similar regardless of whether the outcome probabilities were knowable or 
unknowable. However, participants made harsher judgments overall when the probabilities were knowable 
(Study S5A) rather than unknowable (Study S5B) [t(145) = 2.97, p = .003, d = 0.53, 95% CI[0.26,1.27], BF10 
= 8.3, dS = 0.39]. This suggests that people expect moral agents to make exhaustive efforts to inform 
themselves about their decision, and will hold them accountable for not doing so. However, the size of this 
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negligence effect (d = 0.53) was only about half that of the optimality effect (d = 1.05 for Study S5A and d = 
0.82 for Study S5B). 
 
Study S6: Unknown Outcomes 
Study S6 tested two further questions about efficiency-based moral judgment. First, would this effect 
occur even when the outcome is unknown? Given that moral judgments are often tied to concrete 
outcomes (e.g., Baron & Hershey, 1988), people may only judge the agent’s suboptimal choice relative to a 
particular outcome. This can lead to a biased search for justifications in light of the outcome (see Alicke, 
2000). When the outcome is negative, people may search for reasons to justify negative judgments (and 
suboptimality would be one such reason) and when the outcome is positive, people may search for reasons 
to justify positive judgments (and optimality would again be one such reason). But when there is no 
outcome, this sort of outcome-based reasoning would be avoided altogether, which might erase the 
optimality bias (see Tversky & Shafir, 1992 for a similar phenomenon). Study S6 tested this possibility by 
omitting the outcome. 
Second, to what extent do participants have conscious awareness of using efficiency-based thinking?  
Study 7 in the main text found that people mispredict their blame judgments for ignorant agents, believing 
that they would either differentiate among all three choices or give similar judgments to all three choices. 
This suggests that people lack awareness of using the Efficiency Principle. To further test this issue, 
participants in Study S6 were asked to choose a justification for their judgments. 
 
Methods. We recruited 336 participants (Mage = 33, 45% female); 90 were excluded due to incorrect 
answers to check questions. 
The method was the same as Study S5B, with two changes. First, the outcome was omitted from the 
vignettes. Second, on the page after the main measures, participants were asked to justify their responses by 
selecting one of three options — a mentalistic justification (“The doctor believed that she gave her patient 
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the best treatment available, and couldn't have known otherwise, therefore she is not responsible for the 
harm which this choice may cause”), an efficiency-based justification (e.g., “The fact that the doctor didn't 
know which treatment was best does not remove her responsibility for the harm which this choice may 
cause”), or ‘other’ (writing in their own justification). The order of the mentalistic and efficiency-based 
justifications was randomized. 
 
Results and discussion. Although Study S6 omitted outcomes, judgments were again more positive 
for agents choosing Best rather than Middle [t(169) = 6.49, p < .001, d = 0.99, 95% CI[0.95,1.79], BF10 > 
1000, dS = 0.44; Figure S1], but did not differ between Middle and Worst [t(163) = 1.01, p = .32, d = 0.16, 
95% CI[–0.20,0.63], BF01 = 5.0, dS = 0.42]. Thus, efficiency-based judgments are not tied to concrete 
outcomes, but occur even when the outcome is not specified. Indeed, the size of the effect was no smaller 
when outcomes were omitted (d = 0.99) as compared to previous studies (varying from d = 0.30 to d = 
1.11), suggesting that efficiency-based thinking is tied entirely to the optimality of the agent’s decision rather than 
to the outcome. 
 
Justification Proportion 
Means 
Best Middle Worst 
Mentalistic 65.0% 6.27 5.28 5.13 
Efficiency-Based 27.6% 5.06 3.43 3.29 
Other 7.3% 6.30 4.50 3.50 
 
Table S2. Response patterns in Study S6. 
Note. Means are broken down according to the justifications chosen by participants. 
Means for the ‘other’ justifications are highly imprecise given the small cell sizes (18 
participants total across three between-subjects conditions).  
 
Most participants appear to be unaware of using an efficiency-based strategy, because 65.0% of participants 
selected the mentalistic justification (which argued that the agent should be exculpated), compared to 27.6% 
who selected the efficiency-based justification (which held the agent blameworthy) and 7.3% who selected 
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‘other’ (see Table S2). Further, responses were similar regardless of the explicit justification provided: Both 
the mentalistic and efficiency-based participants distinguished between Best and Middle [t(111) = 4.64, p < 
.001, d = 0.87, 95% CI[0.57,1.42], BF10 > 1000, dS = 0.54 for mentalistic; t(42) = 3.88, p < .001, d = 1.22, 
95% CI[0.78,2.48], BF10 = 77.2, dS = 1.02 for efficiency-based], while neither group distinguished between 
Middle and Worst [t(103) = 0.74, p = .46, d = 0.15, 95% CI[–0.25,0.54], BF01 = 5.1, dS = 0.52 and t(50) = 
0.45, p = .66, d = 0.13, 95% CI[–0.47,0.75], BF01 = 4.4, dS = 0.76, respectively]. Thus, even participants who 
self-reported an exculpatory mentalistic justification used efficiency-based reasoning. 
These results suggest, together with Study 7, that participants lacked introspective access to the effects 
of the Efficiency Principle on their behavior. Further, people appear to construct post hoc justifications for 
their efficiency-based inferences, since nearly two-thirds of participants chose the mentalistic justification. 
Although it is possible that some participants thought that both justifications had merit, the key point is that 
regardless of which justification was deemed more important, participants had the same degree of optimality 
bias. This makes the bias all the more troubling in everyday moral judgment, since people may have 
difficulty identifying when they or others are falling prey to it. 
 
Appendix S1: Vignette Wordings 
 
Note. Exact text corresponds to Study 1 in the main text. Cross-reference with Appendices S2 and S3 to 
construct the vignettes used in the other studies. 
 
Doctor A doctor working in a hospital has a patient who is having hearing problems. This patient has three, and only 
three, treatment options. The doctor believes that all treatment options have a 70% chance of giving the patient 
a full, successful recovery. But in fact the doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
  1) If she gives the patient treatment LPN, there is a 70% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
  2) If she gives the patient treatment PTY, there is a 50% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
  3) If she gives the patient treatment NRW, there is a 30% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
 The doctor chooses treatment LPN, and the patient does not recover at all. The patient now has permanent 
hearing loss. 
 
Farmer A local farmer needs to add insecticide to all her crops. The farmer has three, and only three, insecticide 
options. The farmer believes that all options have a 70% chance of solving her insect problem while also 
leaving the local river completely uncontaminated. But in fact the farmer’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
  1) If she uses brand LPN, there is a 70% chance the river will remain uncontaminated. 
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  2) If she uses brand PTY, there is a 50% chance the river will remain uncontaminated.  
  3) If she uses brand NRW, there is a 30% chance the river will remain uncontaminated. 
 The farmer chooses option [LPN/PTY/NRW], and the river becomes contaminated. A few locals drink the 
water and get extremely sick. 
 
Contractor A building contractor is deciding what cement to use to build the foundation of a new house. The contractor 
has three, and only three, cement options. The contractor believes that all options have a 70% chance of 
withstanding an earthquake, if one occurs. But in fact the contractor is wrong. Actually: 
  1) If he uses brand LPN, there is a 70% chance the house will withstand an earthquake. 
  2) If he uses brand PTY, there is a 50% chance the house will withstand an earthquake.  
  3) If he uses brand NRW, there is a 30% chance the house will withstand an earthquake. 
 The contractor chooses brand [LPN/PTY/NRW], and one day a brief earthquake occurs and the house very 
quickly collapses. Two people who were in the house are killed. 
 
Programmer A computer programmer is deciding what anti-virus software to use in order to protect top-secret government 
information. The programmer has three, and only three, software options. The programmer believes that all 
software options have a 70% chance of saving the government’s information in the unlikely event that a virus 
penetrates the system. But in fact the programmer is wrong. Actually: 
  1) If she uses software LPN, there is a 70% chance that the software will be able to save the information. 
  2) If she uses software PTY, there is a 50% chance that the software will be able to save the information. 
  3) If she uses software NRW, there is a 30% chance that the software will be able to save the information. 
 The programmer chooses software [LPN/PTY/NRW], and 5 months later a virus penetrates the system and 
all the information is immediately lost. 
 
Jet Pilot A jet pilot is deciding what type of missile to use for a combat mission that will take place at a very high 
altitude. The pilot has three, and only three, missile options. The pilot believes that all missile options have a 
70% chance of successfully hitting their target at this altitude. But in fact the pilot is wrong. Actually: 
  1) If he uses missile LPN, there is a 70% chance the missile will successfully hit its target.  
  2) If he uses missile PTY, there is a 50% chance the missile will successfully hit its target.  
  3) If he uses missile NRW, there is a 30% chance the missile will successfully hit its target. 
The pilot chooses missile [LPN/PTY/NRW], and during combat the missile completely misses its target and 
instead hits a jet from the pilot’s own air force. The pilots of that jet are immediately killed. 
 
Paramedic A paramedic needs to drive to a hospital in order to deliver a kidney to a patient who is having an emergency 
kidney transplant. The paramedic has three, and only three route options to get to the hospital. The paramedic 
believes that all the options will give him a 70% chance of arriving in time to save the patient’s life. But in fact 
the paramedic is wrong. Actually: 
  1) If he takes route LPN, there is a 70% chance he will successfully deliver the kidney in time. 
  2) If he takes route PTY, there is a 50% chance he will successfully deliver the kidney in time. 
  3) If he takes route NRW, there is a 30% chance he will successfully deliver the kidney in time. 
 The paramedic chooses route [LPN/PTY/NRW], and arrives far too late. The patient dies. 
 
CEO The CEO of a company is deciding what type of material to use in order to make a new biohazard suite. The 
CEO has three, and only three options. The CEO believes that all three options have a 70% chance of 
protecting suit users from high levels of radiation. But in fact the CEO is wrong. Actually: 
 1) If he chooses material LPN, there is a 70% chance that suit users will be protected from high levels of 
radiation. 
 2) If he chooses material PTY, there is a 50% chance that suit users will be protected from high levels of 
radiation. 
 3) If he chooses material NRW, there is a 30% chance that suit users will be protected from high levels of 
radiation. 
 The CEO chooses material [LPN/PTY/NRW], and 2 months later 2 suit users die of radiation poisoning. 
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Broker An investment broker is deciding which investment option to choose for her client’s life savings. The 
investment broker has three, and only three, options. The investment broker believes that all three options 
have a 70% chance of surviving an economic downturn. But in fact the investment broker is wrong. Actually: 
 1) If she chooses option LPN, there is a 70% chance her client’s life savings will survive an economic 
downturn. 
 2) If she chooses option PTY, there is a 50% chance her client’s life savings will survive an economic 
downturn. 
 3) If she chooses option NRW, there is a 30% chance her client’s life savings will survive an economic 
downturn. 
 The investment broker chooses option [LPN/PTY/NRW], and 3 months later there is a brief economic 
downturn and her client immediately loses her entire life’s savings. 
 
 
Appendix S2: Condition Wordings 
 
Note. Cross-reference with Appendices S1 and S3 to construct the vignettes used in each study. 
 
A doctor working in a hospital has a patient who is having hearing problems. This patient has three, and 
only three, treatment options. 
  Positive intention The doctor intends to choose the best treatment option for her patient. 
Neutral intention The doctor does not intend to choose the best treatment option for her 
patient. 
Negative Intention  The doctor intends to choose the worst treatment option for her patient. 
  Ignorant The doctor believes that all treatment options have a 70% chance of 
giving the patient a full, successful recovery. 
Due diligence Based on many articles that the doctor has carefully read in respected 
medical journals, she truly believes that all three options have a 70% 
chance of giving the patient a full, successful recovery. 
Knowledgeable The doctor knows that: 
  Knowability unspecified But in fact the doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
Knowable In fact, there is some existing evidence that says this belief is incorrect. As 
it happens, the doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
Unknowable In fact, all of the existing evidence says that this belief is correct. But as it 
happens, for reasons completely outside of her control, the doctor's belief 
is wrong. Actually: 
 1) If she gives the patient treatment LPN, there is a 70% chance the patient will have a full recovery.  
2) If she gives the patient treatment PTY, there is a 50% chance the patient will have a full recovery.  
3) If she gives the patient treatment NRW, there is a 30% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
  Negative outcome The doctor chooses treatment [LPN/PTY/NRW], and the patient does 
not recover at all. The patient now has permanent hearing loss. 
Positive outcome The doctor chooses treatment [LPN/PTY/NRW], and the patient 
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recovers. The patient has no permanent hearing loss. 
Unspecified outcome The doctor chooses treatment [LPN/PTY/NRW]. 
Hypothetical negative outcome Imagine that the doctor chose treatment [LPN/PTY/NRW], and that the 
patient did not recover at all, suffering permanent hearing loss. 
  Inevitable We now also know that the patient had a gene that would have allowed 
any treatment to cure the disease. 
  Wrongness How wrong was the doctor's behavior? 
Punishment How much should the doctor be punished? 
Praise/blame What does the doctor deserve to receive for her behavior? 
Explanation To what extent do you feel that an explanation is necessary for the 
doctor’s choice? 
Negligence While answering the question about blame, did you think that if the 
doctor had thought more carefully or done more research, then she would 
have been able to know which options were better and which were 
worse? 
Egocentrism While answering the question about blame, did you think that the doctor 
had some sense of which options were better and which were worse? 
Hypothetical praise/blame What would the doctor deserve to receive for her behavior? 
 
 
Appendix S3: Structure of Cases 
 
Note. Cross-reference with Appendices S1 and S2 to construct the vignettes used in each study. 
 
Study Intent Knowledge Knowable Outcome Dependent Measures 
1A — Ignorant — Negative Wrongness 
1B — Ignorant — Negative Punishment 
2 — Due Diligence Unknowable Negative Praise/Blame 
3 — Due Diligence Unknowable Negative 
Explanation 
Praise/Blame 
4 — Due Diligence Unknowable Positive / Inevitable Praise/Blame 
5 — Due Diligence Unknowable Negative 
Praise/Blame 
Negligence 
Egocentrism 
6A — Due Diligence Unknowable Negative 
Wrongness  
Praise/Blame 
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6B — Knowledgeable — Negative 
Wrongness  
Praise/Blame 
7 — Due Diligence Unknowable Hypothetical Negative 
Hypothetical 
Praise/Blame 
S3A — Due Diligence — Negative Praise/Blame 
S3B — Due Diligence — Positive Praise/Blame 
S4A Positive Due Diligence — Negative Praise/Blame 
S4B Neutral Due Diligence — Negative Praise/Blame 
S4C Negative Due Diligence — Negative Praise/Blame 
S5A — Due Diligence Knowable Negative Praise/Blame 
S5B — Due Diligence Unknowable Negative Praise/Blame 
S6 — Due Diligence Unknowable Unspecified Praise/Blame 
 
 
Appendix S4: Sample Size Planning 
Sample sizes for all experiments were planned a priori, using effect size estimates based on related studies 
(Johnson & Rips, 2014, under review). For most of the between-subjects studies (Studies 1, 3, 4 and S3–S5), 
we aimed for a sample size of 168 per study, in order to achieve 90% power. A somewhat smaller sample 
size was used in Study 3, due to a participant recruitment error. 
We doubled the planned sample size (target N = 336, with small fluctuations across studies) for Studies 
2, 5, and S6, for the following reasons. In the case of Study 2, a pilot study found a similar pattern of means 
but was underpowered due to a smaller effect size (compared to the other studies). In the case of Studies 5 
and S6, we planned to study the relationship between participants’ moral judgments and their responses to 
other questions (egocentrism and negligence attributions in Study 5 and justifications in Study S6), requiring 
a larger sample size. 
We planned a smaller sample size (target N = 96, with small fluctuations across studies) in Studies 6 and 
7, compared to the between-subjects studies. The studies manipulated the key independent variable within-
subjects, so fewer participants were needed to achieve similar levels of power. 
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Sample sizes varied slightly from the target in some studies due to recruitment procedures. Sensitivity 
power analyses are reported for all t-tests, with the dS statistics referring to the minimum effect size that 
would be detectable with 80% power given the actual sample size (after exclusions). 
 
Appendix S5: Exclusion Criteria 
Check Questions. Check questions were used in all studies in the main article and Supplementary 
Materials. For Studies 2–5, participants answered the following questions for their assigned vignette: 
Belief.  “TRUE or FALSE: The doctor believed that all [three treatments] had a 70% chance of leading 
to [recovery].” 
Choice. “Given the treatment that the doctor chose, what was the actual chance of [that treatment 
leading to recovery]?” 
Knowability. “Did the doctor have any way of knowing that this belief [about the probabilities] was 
false, or was it outside of her control?” (answer options: “Yes, there was evidence saying that her 
belief was incorrect” or “No, it was outside her control”) 
For Norming Studies S1 and S2, participants answered the following questions: 
Choice. “What was the chance of success for the option which each person chose?” 
Outcome. “Were the outcomes of these decisions generally good or bad?” 
For Studies 1, 6, 7, and S3–S6, participants answered a subset of the following questions: 
Belief. “Did the doctor know about the actual chances of success for each of the options?” 
Choice. “What was the actual chance of success for the option which the doctor chose?”  
Intention. “Did the doctor intend to choose the best treatment option for her patient?”  
Knowability. “Was there existing evidence about the actual chances of success for each of the options?” 
Specifically, participants in Studies 6 and 7 answered a generalized version of the belief question, a 
generalized version of the knowability question (Studies 6A and 7), and the choice question for each 
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vignette (Studies 6A and 6B). Participants in Studies 1 and S3–S6 answered the belief and choice questions, 
as well as either the intention question (Study S4 only) or knowability question (Studies S5 and S6). 
 
 Exclusion criteria. Because our hypotheses are predicated on the assumption that participants 
understand the agent’s belief and choice, as well as the unknowability of the probabilities, participants 
incorrectly answering any of these questions were excluded from analysis for most of the studies (Studies 1–
4 and S3–S5) and for the norming studies (S1–S2). However, the results generally did not depend on this 
decision. When the analyses were repeated on all participants for these studies (1–4 and S3–S5), the 
comparisons had similar significance levels as the primary analyses in nearly all cases (see Table S3). 
For the remaining studies (Studies 5–7 and S6), we planned to look at individual differences and to 
compare the results across studies. Many participants in these studies misunderstood the “knowability” 
question asked in some of these studies. Therefore, we excluded any participant from these studies who 
incorrectly answered any question except the knowability question. Once again, this decision did not affect 
the outcomes of the analyses. When the analyses were repeated on only participants answering all questions 
correctly, all Best–Middle and Middle–Worst comparisons had similar significance levels. 
Study 
Best–Middle (p) Middle–Worst (p) 
Main 
Analysis 
Alternative 
Criteria 
Main 
Analysis 
Alternative 
Criteria 
1A <.001 <.001 .78 .85 
1B <.001 <.001 .11 .30 
2 .036 .20 .25 .098 
3 .027 .052 .79 .088 
4 .001 <.001 .67 .76 
5 <.001 .018 .77 .37 
6A <.001 <.001 .066 .44 
6B <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
7 <.001 .023 <.001 .001 
S3A .006 .001 .42 .66 
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S3B .001 .001 .16 .24 
S4A .001 .001 .45 .026 
S4B .010 .002 .28 .15 
S4C .006 .001 .081 .12 
S5A <.001 <.001 .27 .69 
S5B .037 <.001 .48 .76 
S6 <.001 <.001 .32 .37 
Table S3. Response patterns in Study S6. 
 
Note. Entries are p-values for the primary dependent measure in each study (blame and 
wrongness are averaged for Study 6), for the comparisons between the Best and Middle 
conditions and between the Middle and Worst conditions. For each pair of columns, these 
analyses are reported first using the exclusion criteria for the main text analyses and second 
using the alternative exclusion criteria described above. 
 
